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Article
Guatemala's Peace Accords in a Free
Trade Area of the Americas
Gus Van Hartent
Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to
local conditions, remains aluays subordinate to Guatemalan
laws, cooperates with the economic detelopment of the
country, and strictly abstains from intervening in the nation's
social and political life.
-- Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
Inaugural address, 19512
L-TRODUCTION
On New Year's Day. 1997, for the first time in nearly four decades.
Guatemala was officially "at peace." The last of twelve peace accords 2
had been signed. putting in place a broad mandate for reform to address
many of the historical grievances of the country's marginalized and
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1. Cited in STEPHEN Sft ESINGER & STEPHIIN KL\-ZER_ BrrER FRUIT: THE U_-TOID
--ORYOFTHE AMERICkN Coup ',- GUATE3LALA 52 (19.2).
2. For the text of the peace accords, see 36 1.131 274. 274--339.
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impoverished majority. Real hopes were born that a time of democracy
and progressive change had finally arrived in Guatemala, after thirty-
six years of terrible conflict.
Alongside the internal peace process, Guatemala has taken part in
negotiations toward a hemispheric free trade zone, the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), along with the thirty-three other countries
that launched the project in Miami in 1994. 3 Their declared purpose in
pursuing an FTAA is a laudatory one. According to the opening words of
the Miami Declaration: "The elected Heads of State and Government of
the Americas are committed to advance the prosperity, democratic
values and institutions, and security of our Hemisphere. For the first
time in history, the Americas are a community of democratic societies."
4
The twin paths toward domestic peace and wider economic
integration in Guatemala are portrayed as harmonious. The country's
ambassador to Canada, for instance, wrote in May 1997 that the
momentum toward "far-reaching political, social and economic changes"
following the peace process will be fueled by trade and investment
liberalization in the Americas "based on openness rather than
protectionism" and driven by "Central America's keen desire to expand
foreign investment and trade."5 U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke in the
same vein last year, during a visit to Guatemala in which he apologized
for U.S. involvement in the country's conflict, when he highlighted his
desire to discuss "other matters critical to peace and to development
and reconciliation, including economic liberalization, market opening
measures, [and] increased trade and investment."
6
But are the paths to peace and integration so naturally
complementary? This Article questions the official invocation of
harmony by examining the potential impact of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) on the Guatemalan peace accords. More specifically,
it attempts to anticipate arguments that foreign investors could pursue
under an FTAA agreement on investment in order to resist prospective
government policies stemming from the peace accords. Given the
centrality of land issues to the preservation of peace and political
stability in the Guatemalan context, the assessment focuses on
commitments relating to land under two of the peace accords: the
Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Indigenous
3. See Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 808 [hereinafter Miami Declaration].
4. Id. 34 I.L.M. at 810.
5. Francisco Villagran de Leon, Should Canada Extend a Commercial Hand to
Guatemala?, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 17, 1996, at A17.
6. William J. Clinton, Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts in
Guatemala City, 35 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 395, 396 (Mar. 10, 1999). Regarding the
apology, the President said: "For the United States, it is important that I state clearly
that support for military forces or intelligence units which engage in violent and
widespread repression of the kind described in the report was wrong, and the United
States must not repeat that mistake." Id. at 395.
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Accord); and the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and
Agrarian Situation (Socio-Economic Accord).s
The thrust of the Article is that an FTAA investment agreement-
and international investment agreements in general-may be
inconsistent with sovereign and democratic decisionmaking at the
domestic level. Given that one of their central purposes is to "discipline-
governments, and thereby protect investors, international investment
agreements may provide investors with unwarranted leverage to
influence political decisionmaking and thus constrain the scope for
governments to pursue national strategies for development and reform.
The Guatemalan peace accords provide a compelling example of this
phenomenon given the deep resonance that they hold as a symbol of
hard-fought democratic negotiation and political compromise by diverse
social sectors to end decades of war and violence, itself stemming from
extreme political and economic marginalization of popular majorities by
a powerful economic elite. Indeed, after decades of conflict, the prospect
that the hard-won Government commitments to pursue critical land-
related reforms might be undermined by the threat of investor
challenges under an FTAA investment agreement is a cause for serious
concern.
In Part I of this Article, I review the recent peace process in
Guatemala, suggesting that the peace accords create vital possibilities
for reform. primarily through the future election of governments that
are more democratically accountable to popular priorities. I also discuss
the centrality of land as a source of historic conflict in Guatemala. and,
in light of this. summarize the Governments commitments on land
under the Indigenous Accord and the Soc io-Economic Accord. In Part H.
I locate the proposed FTAA agreement on investment within the
broader international "push" to establish higher standards of investor
protection in the process of transnationalization. I also review some of
the precedents for an FTAA investment agreement. based on bilateral
investment treaties, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAIFA).9 and the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MIA),10 and outline the key principles on which stronger investor
protection is based. In Part EEL I assess the potential impact of an
FTAA investment agreement on the ability of Guatemalan governments
to carrv out the State's commitments on land issues under the peace
accords. This assessment relies on an anticipatory analysis of the
7. Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples- Mar. 31. 1995. U.N. Doc.
A/491882. 36 LL.ML 285 (entered into force Dec. 29. 1996) [hereinafter Indigenous Accord].
8. Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation. May 6. 1996.
U.N. Doc. AV50/1996. 36 I.LM. 292 (entered into force Dec. 29. 1996 [hereinafter Socio-
Economic Accord].
9. North American Free Trade Agreement. Dec. 17. 1992. 32 I.LM. 605 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
10. See Directorate for Fin_. Fiscal & Enterprise Aff., OECD, The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: The MAI4Negotiatng Text (visited Mar. 29. 2000) <httpJwww.
oecd.org/daflinvestmentfdi/mai'maitext.pdf> [hereinafter Draft _\fA1I.
2000]
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arguments that investors might use under an FTAA investor-to-state
mechanism to challenge various policies stemming from the peace
accords. Finally, I conclude with a short discussion of the significance of
the analysis for issues of sovereignty and democratic accountability in
Guatemala and elsewhere, and possible popular responses in the case of
the FTAA negotiations.
I. GUATEMALAN PEACE ACCORDS
Tens of thousands gathered in Guatemala City's central square to
celebrate the signing of the final peace accord between the Guatemalan
Government and the country's guerrilla forces, the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Union (URNG), on December 29, 1996.11 They
rejoiced in the sensation of peace and the expectation of change. During
one of the formal signing ceremonies in Oslo, Norway, representatives
of different social sectors endorsed the peace accords in pairs: a Mayan
campesino walked with a Ladino university student,12 a trade unionist
with a government official, a military officer with a priest. Thus ended
thirty-six years of war, and thus began the long process to confront the
aftermath of decades of violence and human rights violations
13
organized primarily by the Guatemalan State14 and targeted most
ferociously against the country's majority Mayan population. 15 The
11. See generally CLARK TAYLOR, RETURN OF GUATEMALA'S REFUGEES 49-51 (1998)
(discussing events on day of signing of peace accords).
12. There are four defined peoples in Guatemala: the Maya, of Indian origin (60%);
the Mestizo (or Ladino), of Indo-European roots (39%); the Garifuna, of African and
Caribbean origin; and the Xinca, of Pipile origin (1%). See, e.g., TANIA PALENCIA PRADO &
DAVID HOLIDAY, TOWARDS A NEW ROLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
GUATEMALA 52 (1996). The definition of 'IMayan" is admittedly complex; the Mayans are
distinguished less by biological heritage than by "a changing system of social
classification, based on ideologies of race, class, language, and culture." Carol A. Smith,
Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala over Time and Space, in GUATEMALAN
INDIANS AND THE STATE: 1540 TO 1988, at 3 (Carol A. Smith ed., 1990).
13. During the worst phases of the pervasive repression, dating back to the 1950s,
persecution was targeted against virtually any form of organized opposition to the
authority of civilian and military governments. One million people were forced to abandon
their homes, 200,000 were killed or disappeared, and thousands were orphaned or
widowed. See Guatemala-Memory of Silence-Tz'inil Na'tab'al, Report of the Commission
for Historical Clarification, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 44, at 7, 17-18,
U.N. Doc. A/53/928 (1999) [hereinafter CEH Report]; Country Programme
Recommendation: Guatemala, Addendum, UNICEF Executive Board, 3rd Reg. Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/ICEF/1996/P/L.23/Add.1 (1996) [hereinafter UNICEF]. The final report of the
Historical Clarification Commission (conclusions and recommendations) is available at
<http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/englishtoc.html>.
14. Guatemala's truth commission attributed 93 percent of the human rights
violations and acts of violence that it registered to the State, and 3 percent to the
guerrillas. See CEH Report, supra note 13, at 21, 29; Guatemala Blames Military for
Killings, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 26, 1999, at A21.
15. According to the truth commission, the Mayan people "bore the full brunt of the
institutionalized violence." During the worst years of the conflict, from 1981 to 1983, the
military systematically destroyed hundreds of communities in a series of nightmare
campaigns across the western highlands. See CEH Report, supra note 13, at 2. The
4
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violence has left deep physical and emotional scars on millions of
Guatemalans who suffered from, or carried out. the atrocities.' 6 As is
widely understood, these scars can only begin to be healed by
systematically addressing the underlying concerns that prompted and
fueled the war.
Negotiations between representatives of the Government and the
URNG to end the armed conflict began in 1991. although most of the
peace accords were concluded between 1994 and 1996.17 The
compromise embodied in the accords is broad in scope, dealing with
issues of human rights verification, resettlement of uprooted
populations, indigenous rights. socio-economic and agrarian reform, a
truth commission, the role of the military in a democratic society. the
reintegration of the URNG. a cease-fire, and constitutional reforms.
While the conclusion of the Cold War and the support of the
international community=- contributed to the end of the conflict, a wide
cross-section of Guatemalan society participated in the process leading
to the final settlement. Indeed, nongovernmental organizations from
every social sector contributed to the negotiations through the
Assembly of Civil Society (ASC). which submitted consensus proposals
to the negotiating parties. or, in the case of the business sector, through
direct links to the Government9
As such, the peace accords are a critical symbol of Guatemala's
historic compromise between domestic elites seeking to salvage their
guttered international reputation and popular organizations reeling
from decades of repression and war.2" According to Susanne Jonas. the
strategy involved the -mass execution of defenseless children women, elderly people. and
refugees by military troops.- CARLOS M. ViLs. BETWEEN EARTHQUAKES AND VOLCANOES
138 (1995). The Guatemalan Defense Minister at the time announced his intent to -get rid
of the words 'indigenous' and "Indian.- PHILLIP WEARNE & PETER CALV-ERT. THE Mx,1 _-X OF
Gi-ATENLAjA 19 (19.S9 (quoting statements of General Mejia Victores). See also LNICEF.
supra note 13. at 2' JuLAN BURGER. REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE
WORLDS L\1DIGENOUS PEOPLES M_4-85 (19S71.
16. The names of thousands of individual victims of the countless massacres,
murders, disappearances. rapes. and acts of torture are listed in an entire volume of the
final report of the Project of Recovery of Historical Memory. See PROJECT OF RECOVERY OF
HisTORICAL MEMORY. HUIA_\" RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF GUATEMLLA. IV
GUATELIA- NL.NCA MA: ViCTL\MS DEL CONTLICTO (1998, [hereinafter REMHI
REPORr.
17. The final accord was signed on December 29. 1996. bringing irtually all of the
other accords into effect.
18. See, e.g.. Jeremy Armon et al, Contexio Hist6rico, in GUATEMIAL 198.3-1997:
jIACLA, DONDE VA L-, TRANsICION. 30-32 (Jeremy Armon et aL eds.. 1997) [hereinafter
GUATEMLAL 1983-19971; Conciliation Resources. Actores Claue en el Proceso de Paz. in
GuA-ENLAiA 1983-1997. supra- at 4-1-47.
19. The ASC was created pursuant to the negotiated commitment on the part of the
Government and the URNG to promote participation in the peace process by -non-
governmental sectors of Guatemalan society of recognized legitimacy, representation and
legality.- See P.ALENCIA PRADO & HOLIDAY. supra note 12. at 32-37 (discussing
contribution of ASC to negotiation of peace accords).
20. Elite resistance to negotiating an end to the conflict was undermined -less by long-
term concerns over democratization than by the -signs of imminent asphyxiation and
international isolation--both economic and political-that would be applied to
2)0001
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accords represent "a splitting of differences between radically opposed
forces, with major concessions from both sides." 21 In the wider context,
the peace process brings to an end one of the worst disasters of human
conflict and violence in recent Latin American history,22 and opens a
period of tentative hope for greater democratic accountability. The
resolution of land issues is central to this process.
A. The Context of the Accords
10 The roots of social crisis and conflict in Guatemala lie in the land.
For centuries, the country's economic model, based on producing
agricultural exports for wealthy markets abroad, 23 has entailed
exploitation of the largely Mayan rural population by a small minority
of landowners. The State has actively promoted this "development"
policy by expropriating land from indigenous Mayan communities,
guaranteeing a constant supply of cheap human labor for the benefit of
large private landowners, 24 and providing low-interest agricultural
Guatemala." Id. at 17.
21. Susanne Jonas, The Peace Accords: An End and a Beginning, 30 NACLA REP. ON
THE AM. 6, 6 (1997).
22. After surveying the literature, the Latin American Weekly Report concluded that
the violence in Guatemala generated the largest number of "extra-judicial executions and
'disappearances' anywhere in Latin America by all accounts." Counting the Toll of State
Terrorism, LATIN AM. WKLY REP., Jun. 8, 1995, at 249.
23. The agro-export model has expanded and diversified in phases-from an almost
exclusive focus on coffee, to include bananas, then cotton, sugar, cardamom, and cattle-
ranching, and, most recently, nontraditional export crops including vegetables, fruits,
seeds, and flowers. Between 1956 and 1980, the total land area devoted to cotton
increased by 2,100 percent, to sugar by 400 percent, and to coffee by 56 percent; from
1960 to 1978, grazing lands for cattle expanded by 21 times. See JAMES PAINTER,
GUATEMALA: FALSE HOPE, FALSE FREEDOM 3 (1987); see also GUILLERMO PEDRONI &
ALFONSO PORRES, POLITICAS AGRARIAS, PROGRAMAS DE AcCESO A LA TIERRA Y
ESTRATEGIAS DE COMERCIALIZACION CAMPESINA 13-14 (1991). Most of the funding for
government loans to support export vegetables and fruits has been provided by the World
Bank, the Inter-American Bank, and USMID. See LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET
HARVEST FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS 3, 44-45, 58 (1995). The expansion of snow peas
and broccoli has been particularly dramatic. Snow pea production, for instance, rose by 17
times from 1983 to 1991, to a total of 24.6 million pounds. By 1991, Guatemala produced
80 percent of snow peas exported to the U.S. from Mexico and Central America. See id. at
44-45; see also Calogero Carletto et al., Sustainability in the Diffusion of Innovations:
Smallholder Nontraditional Agro-Exports in Guatemala, 47 ECON. & CULTURAL CHANGE
345, pt. 1 (1999).
24. Agro-export production in Guatemala originates in colonial history. Since 1519,
Spanish plantations were established by evicting indigenous communities and requiring
Indian labor for the cultivation of cacao, indigo, and cochineal. Under the post-colonial
Liberal regime of General Justo Rufino Barrios, beginning in 1871, the agro-export
economy was more effectively integrated into the global economy by forcibly expanding
private land ownership and increasing coffee exports to meet booming demand on the
international market. See PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note 23, at 17-18, 41; JIM HANDY,
GIFT OF THE DEVIL 21-23 (1984).
According to Susan Berger, "Contrary to general belief, the Guatemalan state
between 1931 and 1991 was a relatively autonomous decisionmaker, and it adopted an
aggressive interventionist stance in directing agrarian development." SUSAN A. BERGER,
6
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credit and technical assistance exclusively to large landowners. 2  As a
result, the agro-export model has generated a skewed distribution of
land, with a small number of Guatemalan and foreign investors
controlling sprawling plantations while the great majority of rural
people struggle to survive on small plots of marginal land, or without
any land at all.2 The concentration of land ownership in Guatemala is
among the highest in the hemisphere.2= and the country's economy
remains heavily biased toward agro-export production. At the close of
1994, U.N. human rights expert M6nica Pinto reported that the
inequitable distribution of land "becomes more acute every day and is
not included on either official or political agendas. --' This highly
inequitable pattern of land ownership is the "most important cause- of
underdevelopment in the Central American region, according to
economic historian John Weeks.30
POLITICAL A-\)D AGRALMiAN DEVELOPMEN- n GUATENLM., 21 1992). Another commentator
adds that -itihe establishment and development of the coffee trade would not have been
possible without strong state support.- VICTOR BL ER-THoAL:. THE POLITICAL
ECONO~mY OF CE-R.L A_\ERICA SIXCE 1920. at 13 (1988).
25. Ninety percent of agricultural credit is absorbed exclusively by large landowners
and agro-exporters for cultivation of coffee. cotton. sugar. and cardamon. The
northwestern highland region. where 80 percent of the population is indigenous and
engages in subsistence farming. receives only 4 percent of agricultural credit. See U.N.
VERIFICATION MiISSION FOR GUAMEMAL-. LJA PROBLENLATCA DE LA TIERRA Ex\- GL-ATEMAL-
2 (1995) [hereinafter MI-INUGUA'_
26. Over the centuries. Mayan communities were pushed progressively out of the
fertile lowlands of the Pacific coast. and eventually from large areas A the highlands
themselves. Deprived of their traditional lands and economic base. many Mayans were
forced to provide cheap seasonal labor for the plantations. See, e.g.. JOHN WEEKS. THE
ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA 111-14 (19'5E STEVEN E. S.c\'DERSON. THE POLITCS
OF TRADE w, LATDN ANMERICAN DE'.ELOPMENT 76-77 (1992): RICILARD WILSON. -LAY -N
RESLRGENCE Lx GUATEmLA 36 11995).
27. According to the last official census, taken in 1979. 2 percent of landowners
possess 65 percent of the arable land- while 88 percent possess only 16 percent of the
land More specifically. 78 percent of farmers are restricted to 10.5 percent of the
country's cultivable land, with an average of 1.05 hectares per family. At the same time.
1.362 plantations-controlled by 0.25 percent of property owners-occupy 34.5 percent of
arable land, and average 1,056 hectares in size. See R- HOUGH Er AL.. LAND A-N-D LABoUR
IN GUArENLl.A: AN -ESSEN-T 1-2. 7 (19 2): MLNUGUA. supra note 25. at 1-2. As
MIXUGUA affirms. conditions of land ownership have not changed significantly since
1979. See id. at 1.
28. The agricultural sector currently accounts for 25 percent of the countr's GDP.
roughly 60 percent of the labor force. and 70 percent of exports. Coffee, sugar and
bananas alone account for nearly half of total exports. See U.S. DEPT OF Co0.. COLN-,RY
COM. GLIDE FOR GUATEMLA 7 (1999) [hereinafter GUATE. CoL. GUIDE1. available in
STAT-US=A Natl Trade Data Bank. Country Com. Guides; Gustavo Palma Murga, El
Acuerdo Socwecondmico " Situacidn Agraria y la Problemdtica de la Tierra en Guatemala.
in GU.ATEALIA 1983-1997, supra note 18. at 73-75: Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc.. N.Y.
TIMES. Nov. 7. 1998. at C3.
29- Assistance to Guatemala in the Field of Human Rights, Report by the Independent
Expert, Mrs. 3l6nica Pinto, on the Situation of Human Right-s in Guatemala. U.N.
Commission on Hum. Rts.. 51st Sess., at 38. U.N. Doc. EXCN.411995/15 (1994) [hereinafter
Pinto Report].
30. See WEEKS. supra note 26. at 4.
7
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Land shortage,31 scant work for low wages, 3 2 the marginalization of
small farmers and traditional agricultural systems, 33 and severe
poverty for most of the rural population 34 characterizes the social
underbelly of agro-export production in Guatemala and the context in
which the war was fought and the peace accords negotiated. In total,
about seventy percent of the Mayan population has no workable land. 3 5
Those who are able to farm possess insufficient plots: roughly eighty-
eight percent of farms in the country are considered too small to provide
for the needs of a family. 36 Crowded into the highland regions by agro-
exports in the coastal lowlands and Northern Transversal,3 7 subsistence
31. Land shortages in the Ixil region of Quiche, for example, have, on average, left
families with about half of what they need to support themselves from the land. See
DAVID STOLL, BETWEEN Two ARMIES IN THE IXIL TOWNS OF GUATEMALA 247 (1993). See
also WILSON, supra note 26, at 43.
32. Land shortage and poverty in the highlands drive campesinos to seek work on the
plantations on a seasonal basis. In 1984, for example, roughly 650,000 Mayan campesinos
made the annual migration from the highlands to work on the coastal plantations. The
size and poverty of the rural population keeps wages abysmally low and dilutes pressure
to improve the hazardous working conditions on the plantations. Also, rural
unemployment has risen in recent years because of falling labor demand on the
increasingly mechanized plantations, the displacement of small farmers by cattle farming,
and the shift to nontraditional agricultural products that require less labor. See, e.g.,
WEARNE & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 19; PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note 23, at 15;
ROSALINDA HERNANDEZ ALARCON, LA TIERRA EN LOS AcUERDOS DE PAZ: RESUMEN DE LA
RESPUESTA GUBERNAMENTAL 4 (1998); PALENCIA PRADO & HOLIDAY, supra note 12, at
11-12.
33. Small farmers suffer from disadvantages other than lack of physical access to
land, such as the absence of a simple, low cost system for land registration and lack of
access to technical support and credit. In 1993, for example, 16 percent of credit from the
banking system went to finance production of basic grains, while 41 percent went to
traditional agro-exports. The most disadvantaged small holders are indigenous women,
who do not have legal protection for land ownership and access to credit. See Palma
Murga, supra note 28, at 75; HERNANDEZ ALARC6N, supra note 32, at 4.
The primary alternative to agro-export production is the cultivation of indigenous
crops for subsistence or small-scale exchange in local markets. Agricultural production in
the highlands, in particular, continues to revolve around the traditional Mayan milpa
system, which combines cultivation of maize and beans, sometimes complemented by
chile, squash and vegetables. See PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note 23, at 12. Speaking
generally, the traditional milpa system has been practiced in an ecologically sustainable
way for millenia, and has provided "social security" for local communities. It is presently
confronted with a range of social, economic and ecological pressures, however. See Peter
Utting, Deforestation in Central America: Historical and Contemporary Dynamics, in
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 17 (Jan P. de Groot & Ruerd Ruben
eds., 1997).
34. In 1994, 72 percent of the rural population lived in conditions of "extreme
poverty," without the basic essentials necessary for life, struggling to get by on a daily per
capita income of less than 20 cents. See Pinto Report, supra note 29, at 18, 66 (citing
estimates by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)).
35. See id. at 38.
36. See FRANCIS E. JOHNSTON & SETHA M. Low, CHILDREN OF THE URBAN POOR: THE
SOCIO-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT OF GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND MALNUTRITION IN
GUATEMALA CITY 8 (1995).
37. Guatemala can be divided into four topographic regions: the Pacific coastal
lowlands, the highlands, the Northern Transversal Strip, and the Petdn. See BERGER,
supra note 24, at 6. The Mayan population is concentrated in the northwest highlands,
with the population of the highland departments ranging from 80 to 95 percent
8
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farmers are commonly forced to cultivate the most marginal of lands. -5
often extending their cornfields far up the steep sides of hills and
volcanoes. This squeezing out of small farmers by agro-exports has in
turn undermined local food securit":39 it has also contributed to
processes of deforestation4o and soil erosion. 41 thus aggravating the
related social problems of land shortage and rural poverty. Yet large
indigenous. See PILiuO & HOLIDAY. supra note 12. at 53. Seven of the nine highland
departments have the lowest levels of human development in Guatemala. See U.N.
DEVELoPtE_\- PROGRA.L GUATEM&v: Los CO_,TRASTES DEL DESARROLLO HCAL3NO 15
(199"- [hereinafter L.NDP,_
3S The most overburdened lands are in the highlands. where the indigenous
population is concentrated. More and more people in the region have had to rely on
increasinsly less land. leading many to clear forests and cultivate soils that are highly
sceptible to erosion. In the Ixil Mayan region of Quiche. for instance, only 40 percent of
the land is suitable for cultivation, and the majority for only certain crops. according to a
government -urvey conducted in the 1980s; due to land shortages. however, most of the
land -had already been deforested for growing maize, leaving behind steeply pitched fields
and brush? STOLL. supra note 31. at 246. According to 1992 statistics, of eight
departments in the country where land use exceeded the relatively high level of 65
percent- four were in the highlands. See U-NDP. supra note 37. at 224: see also Utting.
supra note 3.3. at 1-5-17.
39. See BERGER- supra note 24. at 130 "rhe land crisis not only presented a problem
of subsistence for the Guatemalan peasantry, it also created a national shortage of grains
for domestic consumption.-i. From 1950 to 1979, the land area per capita dedicated to
basic foods fell by more than half. while agro-exports expanded. See TOMt B.ARRY. ROOTS
OF REBELLION 7 (1987. citing F-O. FOOD SECLRITY N LIAT,- AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEkN G9'4). As early as 1955, the government was forced to import large quantities
of corn to make up for national shortfalls. See BERGER. supra note 24. at S. 89. Since the
1970s. production of crops for domestic consumption has grown by only 2.5 percent, less
than the average rate of population growth of 3 percent. See PEDRONI & PORRES. supra
note 23. at 11. 13: BERGER. supra note 24. at "-7-89. Between the early 1980, and early
1990s, imports of -food aid" rose by 15 times, while exports of basic cereals more than
doubled. See WORLD REsOURCES LNsT. ET AL, WORLD RESOURCES 1996-97. at 245 tbL 10.4
(1996). Between 1974 and 1994. moreover, the quantir- of grains fed to livestock as a
percentage of total grain consumption rose from 7 to 25 percent. Id. at 243 tbl.104_
Mayan small farmers, increasingly squeezed off their land by larger agro-interests.
produce most of Guatemala's basic grains for domestic consumption- including 60 percent
of corn. 42 percent of beans, and 31 percent of rice. See PRADO & HOLIDAY. supra note 12,
at 53.
40. The country's forest cover is estimated to have fallen from 65 to 34 percent in the
last four decades, and the rate of deforestation has apparently been rising;, approximately
90 percent of deforestation is attributed to the colonization of new lands by land-hungry
campesinos. See U-NDP. supra note 37. at 103 & n-25. In the highlands. more than 100
communal forests that have been managed and protected by local communities for
centuries are under intense pressure. Land-related factors that threaten these forests
include over-exploitation, land disputes with neighboring landowners. ambiguity in the
definition of property boundaries, lack of community rules and sanctions to guide
communal use, lack of land title registration, invasions, and illicit extractions. See Silvel
Elias Gramajo. Tenencia v Manejo de los Recursos Naturales en las Tierras Comunales
del Altiplano Guatemalteco [Ownership and Management of Natural Resources in the
Communal Lands of the Guatemalan Highlands]. Paper delivered at the 19th Intl
Congress of the Latin Am. Studs. A s n_ Sept. 1995, at 6-7 (on file with The Yale Human
Rights and Development Lau Journal).
41. Deforestation has, in turn. led to soil erosion: by 1992, 83 percent of the entire
country had experienced some erosion. and 10 percent was in an advanced state of
erosion. See UNDP. supra note 37. at 104.
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areas of arable land continue to lie fallow or underused on the
plantations and cattle ranches, while, in many parts of the country,
campesino families subsist on a diet of corn tortillas and salt.42
12 Such gross inequality in access to, and ownership of, fertile lands
has been at the heart of social conflict in Guatemala for centuries, and
remains so today.43 The most significant attempts to address this
conflict occurred under the reformist governments of Jos6 Ar6valo and
Jacobo Arbenz Guzm~n in the decade from 1944 to 1954, popularly
known as the "Ten Years of Spring."44 In 1952, Arbenz passed an
agrarian reform that redistributed underused lands from large
plantations to landless campesinos. 45 Such reform, though moderate,
invoked the wrath of a number of large landowners and investors in
Guatemala, including the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company, the
largest landowner in the country at the time, leading in large part to
Arbenz's overthrow in a 1954 U.S.-backed military coup. 46 The newly
installed government of General Carlos Castillo Armas quickly reversed
the agrarian reform and brutally silenced political opposition, 47 giving
rise to the Guatemalan guerrilla resistance and ushering in decades of
fluctuating waves of popular opposition and repression by the
increasingly militarized state. 48 Land reform has been a central demand
42. See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, NATURAL RESOURCES & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 116 (1987). The departments with the highest proportion of underused
land are located in the agro-export zones along the Pacific coast and in the southeast:
Jalapa, Retalhuleu, Suchitep6quez, Escuintla, and Izabal. See UNDP, supra note 37, at
224.
43. In 1995, for example, the U.N. mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) reported that
the land is "an essential factor, if not the most relevant, in the Guatemalan political,
economic, social and cultural state of affairs" and that "a fair and economically productive
distribution of land might be an indispensable factor for the avoidance of popular disorder
and discontent .. " MINUGUA, supra note 25, at 1 (author's translation). With greater
flourish, the National Coalition of Campesino Organizations declared in July 1998 that
"the unjust distribution of land is the center of all the conflicts that our country has
experienced and a limitation for the development of the country .. " Coordinadora
Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Documento Final y Resoluciones del II Congreso
Nacional Campesino 5 (1998) (on file with The Yale Human Rights and Development Law
Journal) (author's translation).
44. See generally SUSANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATEMALA 26-27 (1991): HANDY,
supra note 24, at 149-64; JIM HANDY, REVOLUTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 86-100 (1994).
45. A total 386,901 acres (16.3 percent) of arable land was expropriated from the
United Fruit Company, at a total compensatory payment in agrarian reform bonds of
$8,304,732. The land was redistributed to 137, 437 families. Land expropriated included
uncultivated land, land not cultivated directly by or for the owner, land rented in any
form, land needed for rural settlements, certain municipal land, and land with water
sources not being used for irrigation, industrial, or cultivation purposes. Land was
compensated for with agrarian bonds, based on the reported tax value of the property. See
BERGER, supra note 24, at 65, 70-71.
46. See Armon, supra note 18, at 23-24; Palma Murga, supra note 28, at 77-78.
47. See BERGER, supra note 24, at 88. See also WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S.
MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II 72-83 (1998). In the political
crackdown following the coup, an estimated 2,000 political and union leaders were exiled
and another 9,000 imprisoned, many of whom were tortured or killed. See BERGER, supra
note 24, at 86.
48. In the 1970s, the military, as well as individual officers, established themselves as
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of the insurgency since the overthrow of Arbenz and. accordingly, a
major issue in the negotiation of the peace accords.
Land continues to be "the epicenter of the social crisis in
Guatemala, " 41 with rural protest confronted time and again by violence
and repression.50 In recent years. campesino groups have responded to
the inequitable land distribution and poverty in the interior of the
country by carrying out occupations of plantations51 Land disputes
have continued to arise since the conclusion of the peace accords5 2
Although rooted in wider conditions of land shortage and rural poverty.
many conflicts are exacerbated by the insecurity of land tenure and the
large landowners in the mineral-rich northern provinces. The armed forces also set up
commercial enterprises, industrial projects. broadcasting companies- and banking
services. See BERGER- supra note 24. at 21,-20. 157. Today. the military enjovs an
economic power base through its -institutional control of financial, commercial industrial.
transport and communications enterprises....- Liisa L North. Reflections on
Democratization and Demilitariratton in Central America, 55 STUD. LN POL EcON. 155.
162 (1998).
49. Alfredo Guerra-Borges. La Cuestion Agraria. Cuestion Clave de la Crisis Scial en
Guatemala [The Agrarian Issue. Key Issue of the Social Crisis in Guatemalal. Paper
presented to seminar at National Autonomous University of Mexico. Nov. 14-17. 19S3.
Mexico City (on file with The Yae Human Rights and Development Law Journalh.
50. Popular protests over land distribution are consistently met with. and follow. state
violence. See, e.g., L\I'L WORK GROUP ON L\DIGENOUS AFF. GULATE\LLA 1978: THE
MASSACRE AT PAZOS S (197S, (discussing murder of Mayan farmers protesting evictions
by local landowners); PEDRONI & POPURE supra note 23. at 20 (discussing march of 15.000
farmers and landless campesinos to capital in 1986 to protest land shortages. shortly after
worst years of repression). According to Berger. by 19'.' "the popular movement- in the
countryside -had been radicalized" and -state terror had increased- That same year. in
its famous declaration entitled El Clamor por la Tierra [The Clamor for the Land], the
Guatemalan Episcopal Conference announced its support tor -those campesino and
indigenous organizations that struggle, for just and legitimate causes, to conserve or
reacquire their lands." BERGER- supra note 24. at 200.
51. See L-NDP. supra note 37. at 232. Landowners have commonly responded t- these
actions by forcibly dislodging campesino groups or by assassinating their leaders, often
with explicit government backing. According to the Washington Office on Latin America.
land conflicts appear to have worsened with the government policy of evicting land
occupiers. See HERNA-NDrZ ALARCON. supra note 32. at 25 see aiso Dennis Moore. The
Case of El Sauce: Land Conflicts Persist -Afer War's End. REP. ON GUATE_ LAL-_ Summer
1998. at 8-9. James Black Scorched Earth In A Time of Peace. 32 NACLA REP. ON THE
AM\s. 11 (1998).
52. See, e.g.. VICTOR ALFREDO LEON Gt3.MELL Er AL. OEA(PROPAZ. Ls
RELACIONES LI-TERSECTORLALES EN LA CONTLICI'IIDAD SoBRE iA TiERRA EN GUiATENLAL
3 (1997) (noting increase in land conflicts as political spaces have opened with signing of
peace accords). A special Presidential commission created under the peace accords to
resolve land conflicts received 17'5 submissions on specific conflicts during its first _
months of operation (June 1997-Feb. 199 ,. Of the reported conflicts. 74 percent related
to demands for land. disputes over land rights. or occupations of lands, and the rest dealt
with conflicts over usurped lands or border disputes among municipalities and
communities. The vast majority of reported conflicts were located in the highlands. See
HEIun.A-DEZ ALARCON. supra note 32. at 47-48.
In some cases. land that was usurped by military officers and large landowners in
the 1970s and 1980s has been reclaimed by its former campesmo and communitv owners.
The Government handed over large areas of land to military officers and other large
landowners from 1974 to 19"5: and. as late as 1988. small farmers were still bein'g
dislocated from properties that their families had worked on for generations. See BERGER,
supra note 2-L at 19.
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absence of a comprehensive land registry.53 Speaking generally, the
country lacks effective legal mechanisms to resolve conflicting claims to
land and, after thirty-six years of violence, the political culture tends
toward confrontation rather than compromise. 54
B. The Peace Accords
14 In the face of this historical conflict over land, Guatemala's peace
accords follow the path of moderation. 55 Although they do not
contemplate a wide-ranging land redistribution, the Government makes
significant commitments in the accords to (1) facilitate access to land
and encourage the productive use of land, (2) resolve land conflicts and
provide security of land tenure, and (3) promote indigenous land rights
generally. As such, the implementation of the accords, and the
achievement of greater democratic accountability, will depend to a large
extent on the degree to which these commitments on agrarian issues
are transformed into meaningful reforms that address conditions of
land shortage and rural poverty. The fate of the commitments on land,
in a very real way, could determine the consolidation of peace in
Guatemala.
15 The two most important accords dealing with agrarian reform and
indigenous land rights are the Socio-Economic Accord and the
Indigenous Accord.56 Both accords were concluded only after long and
difficult negotiations toward a compromise on land. This was especially
true in the case of the Socio-Economic Accord, which was concluded,
following more than a year of negotiations, only after the removal of
sections that were unacceptable to the private sector.57 The accord was
roundly criticized by popular organizations for having given away too
much to the other side.58 In the case of the Indigenous Accord the
compromise reached reflects, in part, the moderated position taken by
53. UNIDAD PARA LA PROMOCI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, OAS, DIAGNOSTICO DE
CONFLICTIVIDAD 10-11 (1996). This preliminary OAS study identifies land as the primary
source of conflict in the country, manifested in legal uncertainty about possession, the
post-war return of refugees and displaced persons, border disputes involving communities
and municipalities, and peasant occupations of plantations. See id. at 8-19; see also
MINUGUA, supra note 25, at 8; HUM. RTS. WATCH/AM., GUATEMALA: RETURN TO
VIOLENCE 28-30 (1996).
54. Palma Murga, supra note 28, at 78 n.8.
55. A program of more fundamental reform would entail state-directed redistribution
of land, taxation of land to encourage its productive use, and support for basic services in
rural areas, including improved labor conditions. See HERNANDEZ ALARC6N, supra note
32, at 63-67. In the face of continuing resistance by traditional elites, options for this type
of fundamental reform "are excluded as alternative policies even though, in another
context, they would demand a great deal of discussion." PEDRONI & PORRES, supra note
23, at 42 (author's translation).
56. See Indigenous Accord, supra note 7: Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8.
57. See David Holiday, Guatemala's Long Road to Peace, CURRENT HIST., Feb. 1997,
at 71.
58. See TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 57.
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the Assembly for Civil Society (ASC) during the peace negotiations.
During the negotiations, the ASC pushed for the recognition of the
indigenous right "to possess. use and administer the lands inhabited by
the Mayan linguistic communities and those they acquire in the future
in accordance with international law," but decided to exclude positions
that were perceived as more radical.5 9 Given the degree of participation
and compromise that went into the negotiation of both accords, the
commitments on land represent key symbols of the aspirations for
democratic accountability, peace, and development in Guatemala.
Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Guatemalan Government
makes various commitments to carry out policies designed to facilitate
access to land. encourage the productive use of land. resolve land
conflicts, and improve security of land tenure.' These include
commitments regarding a land trust fund to benefit landless and small
farmers. 61 a land tax designed to encourage productive use of land,62 a
comprehensive land registry.6 3 the resolution of land conflictsi 4 the
reinstatement of usurped land or compensation of their former
owners,65 recognition of communal land ownership,66 and potential
redistribution of underused lands under Article 40 of the Constitution.
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government recognizes -the
special importance which their relationship to the land has for the
indigenous communities" and commits to undertake broad measures of
reform "in order to strengthen the exercise of their collective rights to
the land and its natural resources. - -s In particular, the Government
makes a range of commitments designed to promote indigenous land
rights, including commitments concerning indigenous access to
traditional lands.9 indigenous participation in decisionmaking
regarding natural resources,' 0 indigenous rights to compensation for
damage caused by resource development projects,' the elimination of
59. The ASC proposal was essentially based on the position put forward by the Mayan
sector of the ASC. with one important exception related to land: the Mayan demand fir
restitution of expropriated communal lands was excluded from the ASC proposal as too
radical See PALENCLA PRADO & HOLIDAY, supra note 12. at 63-64.
60. See HER_,-.%,DEZ AL-kRCO\. supra note 32. at 11: Leopoldo Sandoval Villeda.
Tenencia de la Tierra. Conflictos Agrarios y Acuerdos de Paz [Land Ownership, Agrarian
Conflicts, and the Peace Accords-. 7 FLACSO GUATE. DWALOGO 1. 6-10 (1997).
61. See Socio-Economic Accord. supra note ". para. 34.
62. See id. para. 42.
63. See id. paras. 37(a). 38.
64. See id. paras. 37,f,. 37(h).
65. See id. para- 37hf (ii).
66. See id. paras. 37(d). 37(e).
67. See id. para. 34(c)vi). Article 40 provides: "In concrete cases, private property may
be expropriated for reasons of collective utility., social benefit or public interest, duly
proven ... " GUATE. CoNsT. tit. 1. ch. 1. art. 40 (authors translation).
68. Indigenous Accord. supra note 7. pt. rVqFi(4).
69. See id. pt. lVF(6)(a).
70. See id. pts. IV F(6)(b). IV(E)(3).
71. See id. pt. lV(F)(6)(c).
?000]
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discrimination against indigenous women with respect to land,72 and
the settlement of indigenous land claims. 73
In summary, based on both accords, the Government commits to:74
Facilitate access to land and encourage the productive use of land
by means of:
i. A land trust fund;
ii. Potential redistribution of land under Article 40 of the
Constitution;
iii. A land tax.
Resolve land conflicts and provide security of land tenure by means
of:
i. A comprehensive land registry;
ii. Recognition of communal land ownership;
iii. Reinstatement of usurped lands, or compensation of
their former owners.
Promote indigenous land rights, including
i. Indigenous access to traditional lands for subsistence
and spiritual activities;
ii. Indigenous rights regarding natural resources on their
traditional lands;
iii. The elimination of discrimination against indigenous
women;
iv. Settlement of indigenous land claims.
These commitments are extremely significant in the Guatemalan
context given the close connection between land issues and conditions of
rural poverty and social conflict. As a whole, the accords point to key
areas for reform, achievable through the election of more broadly
representative governments, and have made the previously taboo issue
of land reform a part of the landscape of public debate and popular
organizing. As such, they are powerful symbols of democracy. 75 In terms
of implementation to date, the United Nations has reported tentative
progress 76 as well as significant setbacks. 77 Although there are no
72. See id. pt. IV(F)(9)(g).
73. See id. pt. IV(F)(7).
74. For further discussion, see infra Part III.
75. David Holiday comments:
The "war" has not been the defining element of everyday life in
Guatemala for at least the last 10 years, and the average Guatemalan
does not see that "peace" will bring any radical transformation. Yet it
is precisely this sense of alienation by ordinary citizens from the
political process that the peace negotiations seek to address.
Holiday, supra note 57, at 68.
76. In terms of the successes with respect to land and the agrarian situation, the U.N.
has mentioned the progress achieved in negotiations toward a land trust fund, the
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guarantees that future Guatemalan governments will move forward
with the State's commitments.' the accords have at least laid a
foundation for meaningful changes to occur within a broader, long-term
political process.79 David Holiday suggests that. at best. the peace
accords have given Guatemala -its last viable chance to create a
national agenda for development and democratization. " ) It is this
sentiment of hope that leads us to the question of how wider processes
like the FTAA might impact on the prospects for democratic reform.
creation of the Institutional Commission for the Derelopment and Strengthening of Land
Ownership to coordinate government institutions involved in agricultural issues. and the
increased participation of nongovernmental organizations. The U.N. has also given
special tribute:
both to the State authorities. .. and to the indigenous and peasant
organizations which are responsible for the success of several
unprecedented experiments with consultation. This willingness to put
one'S faith in negotiation and conciliation or such sensitive issues as
inter-ethnic relations and access to land reflects a desire for change
which- we hope. will grow stronger and extend to other areas ....
Other achievements have been highlighted of late in the areas of fiscal policy. human
rights- and the status of women. See The Situation in Central America-Report of the
Secretary General. U.N- GAOR. 53rd SesS.. at 9-10, 16. U.N. Doc A'53/421 (1995S: The
Situation in Central America-Report of the Secretary General. U.N. GAOR. 54th SesS.. at
S-9. U.N. Doc _'54311 (1999).
77. Two major reforms have been derailed following opposition by elite groups. First.
a package of constitutional reforms incorporating elements of the peace accords was
approved by Congress. but was rejected in a national referendum in May. 1999. in the
face of a high abstention rate, 3 percent). Second. proposals for a land tax. as mandated
by the Socio-Economic Accord. were defeated in the face of widespread rural opposition-
instigated by large landowners, during early 199.S. See HER',._ANDEZ ALAROS. supra note
32. at 41-44. Most fundamentally, -is]ince the signing of the Peace _Accords... there has
been little change in national patterns of land tenure-- United Vations erification
Mission in Guatemala tMI(N-GUA)--Report of the Secretary-General. U.N. GAORL 54th
Sess.. at 3. U.N. Doc. A'.54¢35511999).
S. Indeed. implementation of the peace accords faces resistance from powerful social
groups within Guatemala- For an outline of the agricultural, commercial, financial, and
industrial elite interests lined up against fundamental reform, see TAYLOR. supra note 11.
at 64-68; PALENCL PRADO & HOLIDAY,. supra note 12. at 2--32. High-level military and
government officials, for instance, have been linked to the assassination of a leading
advocate of human rights and the peace accords. Bishop Juan Gerardi. See The America&:-
Another Kind of Reconstruction. THE ECO\OxuST. Nov. 14. 199S, at 36-37.
The election of Alfonso Portillo as President of Guatemala in January 2000 may also
not bode well for the mandate of the peace accords, at least in the area of land. Portillo is
leader of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). founded by the infamous General
Efrain Rios Montt. who held power in the early 1980s, overseeing some of the worst
violence against indigenous highland communities, and who now stts in Congress. The
FRG has close ties to landowners and it opposed the land tax in 199S. See The America&:
Portillos progress. THE ECONOMIST. Jan- 22. 2000. at 3k_-39.
9. See, e-g.. Palma Murga. supra note 28. at 73 (UThe political opening now is real
despite many obstacles ... '- (author7S translation): Jonas, supra note 21. at 10 ("[On the
positive side of the balance sheet, the peace process and the Accords have laid the basis
for completing the country's long-interrupted democratic revolution-.
80. Holiday, supra note 57. at 74.
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II. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
20 In December 1994, thirty-four countries, including Guatemala,81
launched negotiations toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) at the first Summit of the Americas in Miami.8 2 To date,
investment rules have been an integral part of the FTAA proposals.8 3
The FTAA governments formed a working group to study the topic in
1994,84 and created a negotiating group on investment, which held its
fourth meeting in August 1999. Their work continues toward concluding
a hemispheric agreement on investment.
A. The "Push"for Stronger Investor Protection
1. Context for the "push"
21 The FTAA investment negotiations are part of a wider effort to
establish higher standards of protection for investors at the
81. Along with the other Central American Governments, Guatemala has maintained
its commitments to establishing an FTAA by 2005 and participates in regular meetings of
the nine FTAA negotiating groups. See The Situation in Central America: Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc A/54/311 (1999).
82. The FTAA governments have committed to creating an FTAA by 2005 and have
instructed their FTAA negotiating groups, made up of government trade negotiators, to
prepare draft texts of diverse parts of the agreement by January 2001. Since 1994, five
trade ministerial meetings have been held, with a sixth meeting scheduled for April 2001
in Argentina. Formal FTAA negotiations have been taking place in Miami since mid-1998.
In total, there are nine negotiating groups, covering the following areas: market access;
investment; services; government procurement; dispute resolution; agriculture;
intellectual property rights; subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties; and
competition policy. See Second Summit of the Americas: Santiago Declaration and Plan of
Action, Apr. 19, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 947, 951 [hereinafter Santiago Declaration]; see also
Miami Declaration, supra note 3, 34 I.L.M. at 811. For more information on each
negotiating group, see FTAA, Negotiating Groups (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.
ftaa-alca.org/ngroup-e.asp>.
83. According to the OAS Trade Unit, the prospect of an FTAA investment agreement
is an opportunity to "put the Americas at the forefront of multilateral consensus-
building," since the goal of a broad multilateral investment agreement has not yet been
accomplished under the WTO. See Trade Unit, OAS, Toward a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.sice.oas.org/TUnit/tftr/index.asp>
[hereinafter OAS Trade Unit].
84. An FTAA working group on investment was formed at the first trade ministerial
meeting in Denver, Colorado in June 1995. See Summit of the Americas Trade Ministerial:
Denver Ministerial Declaration, Jun. 30, 1995, para. 5, available at <http://www.alca-ftaa.
org/ministerials/denvere.asp>. In March 1998, the national trade ministers of the FTAA
governments declared their intent: "To establish a fair and transparent legal framework
to promote investment through the creation of a stable and predictable environment that
protects the investor, his investment and related flows, without creating obstacles to
investments from outside the hemisphere." Summit of the Americas Fourth Trade
Ministerial: San Josi Ministerial Declaration, Mar. 19, 1998, Annex II (Investment),
available at <http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ministerials/costae.asp> [hereinafter Fourth
Trade Declaration].
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international level.K The push is driven by capital-exporting countries
in general and by the United States, Japan. the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany in particular.86 The main purpose is not to
establish standards of investor protection where none have existed
before; rather, it is to strengthen and expand existing international
standards. In this sense, the focus is on changing international
investment rules in order to bolster the position of investors. From
another perspective, the broad impact is to restrain the "degrees of
freedom" available to governments in a range of policy areas that
impact on international investment.':
The push for higher standards of investor protection has occurred
within the context of -transnationalization," s  characterized by
diminished state regulation of foreign direct investment (MFE)).9 the
85. See, e.g.. J.W. Salacuse. BIT In, BIT- The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries. 24 IN-rL LAw. 655, 661
(1990). The United States. in particular, has pursued higher standards via a series of
BITs simed since the early 19 ,4±. See C. V_\-GRASSTEI, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV..
U.S. OB.JECTITES L\- TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
19-21 (1998.
The issue of compensation for state expropriation of assets, particularly those of
foreign investors, has been an issue of conflict in international law since the 19th century,
especially after the process of post-war decolonization and the struggles of newly
independent countries to gain effective control over their natural resources. See generally
STEPHEN GILL & DAVD Lw. THE GLOBAL POLITIC.AL ECONOMSY 208 (1988) (discussing
U-S. military intervention to overthrow governments that nationalized U.S. firms with
inadequate compensation).
86. These are the primary capital-exporting countries. Developing countries may.
however, also push hard for high standards in negotiating investment regimes at the
regional level See. e.g., U.N. CONF. 0N TR-ADE & DEV.. WORLD L\VESTsMEnT_ REPORT 1996.
at 163 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
87. See id.; see also U.N. CETRE ON TRA _N-NAVL CORPS.. GOVERNM.ENT- POLICIES A-\-D
FOREIGN DIRECT LVESTME\I- 1 (1991) [hereinafter UNCTC] (noting that. while most
Governments welcome foreign direct investment, most also regulate it to varying degrees
in order to protect against undesirable investment. reserve some industries for national
investment, and maximize net benefits received). Government policies regarding foreign
investment may reflect national priorities about the structure of the economy and the
allocation of resources and decisionmaking among public and private actors. For instance.
many countries have restricted foreign involvement in especially sensitive or important
sectors, such as natural resources. enerp-. utilities, or banking. or have permitted
investment only under certain conditions designed to improve domestic economic benefits.
ee UNCTAD, supra note 86. at 175.
88. Transnationalization as a historical process has involved rapid technological
change. enhanced capital mobility, and the remapping of political regions. See Ricardo
Grinspun & Maxwell A. Cameron. The Political Economy of North American Integration:
Diverse Perspectives, Converging Criticisms, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE 17 (Ricardo Grinspun & Maxwell A_ Cameron eds.. 1993); see also
GILL & LAW. supra note 85. at 146-55.
89. Prior to World War IL most international investment was portfolio investment.
involving foreign ownership of assets in a country without foreign control of productive
enterprises. With the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the post-war era,
however. FDI has become the dominant form of international investment. FDI is defined
as:
an investment involving a long term relationship and reflecting a
lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident
17
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rise of transnational corporations (TNCs),90 and the ideological
preeminence of neoliberalism, 91 or, the 'Washington Consensus."92 As
such, the neoliberal "globalization project" aims to liberalize investment
rules in order to support the trend toward the dismantling of
government policies to regulate FDI, and the consequent unfettering of
TNCs. In ideological terms, the push for higher standards has been
framed as an effort to establish a stable, predictable and transparent
framework for international investment, to reduce investor uncertainty,
and to facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital across borders. 93
in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI
enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). Foreign direct
investment implies that the investor exerts a significant degree of
influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other
economy.
UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 219. FDI is distinct because it entails foreign control over the
location and management of assets within a country. Control may be exercised through
direct ownership, or through decisions about the management and financing of
operations, the use of technology, and so on. In the case of agro-export production, for
instance, TNCs frequently control the financing, marketing, processing, and distribution
of products while production remains in the hands of local growers. See GILL & LAW,
supra note 85, at 146-47; UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 219; BARRY, supra note 39, at 29.
Governments, especially in developing countries, expanded their policies to regulate
FDI during the 1970s. Since the 1980s, however, governments have dismantled many of
these policies. See UNCTC, supra note 87, at 8; UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 133. This
trend indicates that governments have adjusted "national policies and practices'... to the
exigencies of the world economy of international production." ROBERT W. COX,
PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER 253 (1987).
Governments have also engaged in "policy competition" with each other to provide
favorable conditions for investment by TNCs. See UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 163. This
has prompted governments to provide more favorable corporate tax rates, tax holidays,
direct subsidies, and other incentives "because of competition from other investment
locations." UNCTC, supra note 87, at 8-9. In this context, governments have also allowed
TNCs to outgrow their national boundaries by lowering barriers to investment flows out
of the country. See Andrew Jackson, The MALI and Foreign Direct Investment, in
DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY 250 (Andrew Jackson & Mathew Sanger eds., 1998). According
to Nunnencamp, countries that balk at the pressure to provide more favorable conditions
for foreign investors run the risk of being "de-linked" from a global economy that is run
increasingly by TNCs. See Peter Nunnenkamp, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America in the Era of Globalized Production, TRANSNAT'L CORP., Apr. 1997, at 51, 75.
90. The bulk of FDI is carried out by large TNCs. Since the mid-1980s, FDI has
overtaken trade as the primary means of transnational business expansion by TNCs. See
Gregory Albo & Chris Roberts, The MAI and the World Economy, in DISMANTLING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 89, at 283. On reasons for TNCs preferring FDI to trade, see
U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNAT'L CORP., THE PROCESS OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND
TRANSNATIONAL MERGERS 1 (1989).
91. Neoliberalism calls for greater reliance on market forces and private initiative and
prescribes monetarist structural adjustment policies, the deregulation of market activity,
and the privatization of state enterprises. See Grinspun & Cameron, supra note 88, at 21.
92. The neoliberal model is also referred to as the "Washington Consensus" because it
has been promoted by institutions based in Washington D.C., such as the IMF. See
Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy In Latin America (And Elsewhere):
An Exercise in Institutional Thinking Within Law and Political Economy, 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 169, 175-79 (1995).
93. Thus, the purpose of the proposed MAI, according to one trade lawyer, was "to
reduce or eliminate obstacles to foreign investment, open markets, eliminate
discriminatory treatment (both before and after establishment), reduce 'country risk' and
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Alternatively, perhaps, it may be regarded as a part of the effort by
capital-exporting countries to support the global business strategies of
large TNCs.,-
U.S. capital occupies a preeminent position in the Americas, and
this forms an important part of the context for the FTA_A.95 Under an
FTTAA higher legal standards of investor protection would presumably
provide greater security and leverage for U.S.-based TNCs, which
invest heavily in the region.9 6 It is worth recalling that the U.S. has
clashed with Latin American countries over investor protection in the
past, and the U.S. Government has responded by exerting its economic
and military might to protect the claims of American investors in
reallocate capital to its most productive uses.- Joel W. _Messing. Towards a Multilateral
Agreement on Intestment. TRANSNATL CORP.. Apr. 1997. at 123. 126. In the same vein.
the FT-AA governments have stated that an FTAA investment agreement is needed to
establish -a fair and transparent legal framework- aiming -to promote investment
through the creation of a stable and predictable environment that protects the investor.
his investment and related flows.- Fourth Trade Declaration. supra note S4
94. Ganesan- former Commerce Secretary to the Government of India states that the
main motive* of the dominant capital-exporting countries in pushing for higher
standards -is the gaining and consolidation of market access opportunities for their
business enterprises around the world-- AV. Ganesan, Strategic Options Available to
Developing Countries With Regard to a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 1998
UNCTA.D iv, abstract available online at <httpji/www.unctad-org/en/pub/a134-96.htm>.
Salacuse further comments that the push toward higher standards within bilateral
investment treaties:
has been initiated and driven by Western. capital-exporting states.
Their primary objective has been to create clear international legal
rules and effective enforcement mechanisms to protect investment by
their nationals in the territories of foreign states. The essence of this
protection is to defend the investment and the investor from exercises
of state power by host governments with respect to such matters as
expropriation, treatment, transfer of currency abroad- and restrictions
on operations.
Salacuse. supra note 85. at 661.
Meanwhile, industrialized countries have resisted proposals from developing
countries for a binding international code of conduct for TNCs. while pushing for higher
standards of investor protection. Thus. industrialized countries insisted that U.N.
multilateral initiatives to establish standards for the conduct- behavior, and obligations of
foreign investors be made nonbinding and voluntary. See Ganesan supra. at 4.
It may be noted that the largest TNCs are based primarily in a small number of
capital-exporting countries. Seventy-six of the world-s largest 100 TNCs are based in just
five countries: the U.S.. Japan, United Kingdom. France and Germany. Ninety-eight of
the largest 100 TNCs are based in just 13 industrialized countries- See UNCTAD. WORLD
L\vEsT iEr REPORT 1998, at 36-39 (159,i [hereinafter LNCLAD REPORT].
95. U.S.-based TNCs currently account for about 40 percent of FDI in Latin America
and the Caribbean. See U-_CTAD REPORT. supra note 94, at 24.3-45. Indeed. the broad
political origins of the FT-AA have been tied. since the 1980s. to the U.S. interest in
establishing a western hemispheric trade bloc in order to retrench its economic position in
the face of challenges from Europe and Asia. See R. Grinspun & R. Kreklewich.
Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms "Free Trade" as a Conditioning Framework. 43 STUD.
IN POL ECON. 33, 46 (1994). See generaly KENICHI OHMAE. TRIAD POwER. THE COMINNG
SHAPE OF GLoBAL COMPETITIoN (1985).
96. Latin America was the destination for 19.6 percent of all U.S- FDI during 1996-
98. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM.. 79 SURVEY OF CURRENT BU-S .. at D-14 tbLG.2 (1999).
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various episodes during the last century.97 In legal terms, the conflict
has played itself out in the divergent positions, exemplified by the Calvo
Doctrine, 98 on the issue of how a foreign investor should be treated in
the event of a state expropriation of its property. 99
2. Definition of Stronger Protection
24 The current push for stronger investor protection has generally
aimed to get governments to adopt various policies regarding
international investment for prescribed periods. Broadly speaking,
these include the following: 00
97. According to commentators, "[i]nvestment disputes have been a perennial source
of friction in U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries." Craig
VanGrasstek & G. Vega, The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Regional Model?,
in THE PREMISE AND THE PROMISE: FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 165 (Sylvia Saborio ed.,
1992).
98. The Calvo Doctrine, which many Latin American governments have espoused as
official policy, is named after the Argentinian jurist, C. Calvo, who first articulated it in
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THItORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE 118 (A. Rousseau ed., 1896). The
main tenets of the doctrine are:
(a) that, under international law, States are required to accord to
aliens the same treatment as afforded to their own nationals
under national law,
(b) claims by aliens against the host State must be decided solely by
the domestic courts of that State, and
(c) diplomatic protection by the State of the investor's nationality
can be exercised only in cases of direct breach of international
law and under restrictive conditions. -
UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 133.
99. The historical U.S. position has been that state expropriations of foreign property
are unlawful under international law unless they meet rigorous conditions, including the
payment of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. Latin American countries, on
the other hand, have asserted that foreign property is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the government of the host country, which may determine how compensation for an
expropriation is to be assessed and paid. According to one commentator: "By adhering to
the Calvo Doctrine, Latin American countries have been fighting against the use of force
or pressure by other countries under the guise of diplomatic protection." See UNCTAD,
supra note 86, at 191; C6sar Augusto Bunge & Diego C6sar Bunge, The San Josd de Costa
Rica Pact and the Calvo Doctrine, 16 INTER-AM. L. REV. 17, 32 (1984).
In this light, NAFTA was a significant breakthrough for the U.S. position, since both
Canada and Mexico accepted what is essentially the U.S. standard of compensation under
the agreement. Prior to NAFTA, both countries had resisted pressure to concede on the
issue of sovereign authority over foreign investors and Mexico, in particular, had been a
leading proponent of the Calvo Doctrine. The shift in orientation prompted Daniel Price, a
key U.S. negotiator of Chapter 11, to call the NAFTA expropriation provisions "one of the
truly significant provisions of the agreement." See J. Raby, The Investment Provisions of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 394, 419 (1990); Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA's Provision for Compensation in the Event of
Expropriation: A Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate and Effective" Standard, 31
STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 447 (1995); Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 737
(1993).
100. The following is adopted from a summary provided in UNCTAD, supra note 86,
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* broadening the definitions of investment - 10 1 and "investor.-
* applying "disciplines" to a wider range of government policies.
" expanding notions of national treatment (by means of an effects
test and a right of establishment, for example),
* prohibiting performance requirements imposed by governments.
" broadening definitions of expropriation and compensation,
* creating an enforceable investor-to-state dispute resolution
mechanism,
* providing for -rollback- of exceptions to the agreement.
* providing for "standstill" regarding future government
measures, and
* establishing a much longer "lock-in- period.
In essence, all of these elements of the push for higher standards of
investor protection have the corresponding effect of expanding and
deepening existing legal restraints on the ability of governments to
regulate investors. As such, the higher standards may be contrasted
with more conventional principles of international investment law in
terms of the degree to which they constrain government policymaking
authority. Below, I briefly describe each of the expanded investor
standards, contrasting them with the more conventional principle they
aspire to replace.
i. Effects Test
The conventional trade principle of national treatment requires that
a government treat foreign investors no less favorably than it treats
at 162.
101. To illustrate. investment- has been variably defined under conventional
investment agreements to include such assets as movable and immovable property rights.
equity in companies. claims to money and contractual rights. copyrights and industrial
property rights. concessions licenses. and similar rights. More recent agreements have
expanded---or sought to expand-the definition, by including non-equity forms or
contractual rights concerning the transfer of technology intangible assets and such
administrative rights as licenses and permits, or even portfolio investment- See UNCTAD.
supra note S6. at 174. Some commentators have proposed expanding the notion of
investment even further. See Michael P. Avramovich. The Protection of International
Investment at the Start of the T entv-First Century: 1 ill Anachronistic Notions of
Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Intestment?. 31 J.
M FSHLAL  REv. 1201. 1204 (1998).
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domestic persons or companies. 102 Government policies that favor
domestic actors-by, for example, giving them exclusive benefits or
preferred treatment-are said to be "discriminatory" against foreign
investors, and may be attacked under conventional principles of
international investment law. An effects test expands upon national
treatment by requiring not only that a government not purposely
exclude foreign investors from benefits conferred upon nationals, but
that it also not implement any policy or measure that has any indirect
effects on foreign investors that are not equally felt by nationals. 103
Thus, even a facially neutral policy that evinces no intent to confer any
distinct benefit may be open to attack under the expanded investor
standards if, because of circumstances unique to a given country or
foreign investor, it disadvantages a foreign investor vis-a-vis domestic
persons or companies.
ii. Right of Establishment
10 4
27 International investment treaties have, in the past, tended to limit
the application of national treatment to the post-establishment phase of
an investment. That is, a foreign investor would be guaranteed non-
discriminatory treatment only after it was allowed into the host
country, in accordance with the country's laws and regulations. 05 A
right of establishment in effect applies national treatment to the entry
and establishment phases of an investment. As such, it requires a
government to allow foreign investors to enter its domestic market
without restriction. This right would normally be subject to certain
exceptions; in absolute terms, however, governments would be required
to allow one hundred percent foreign access and ownership in every
economic sector. Any barrier to free foreign access and ownership in the
domestic economy would potentially be open to an investor attack.
iii. Uniform National Treatment
28 The principle of uniform national treatment expands conventional
national treatment by requiring that foreign investors be treated
uniformly by all regulatory entities within a nation's borders. Thus, it
would be a violation of national treatment for subnational governments
(i.e. local, provincial, state, territorial) to provide varying standards of
treatment within a country. In some cases, foreign investors might be
entitled to the best subnational treatment available, no matter where in
102. See Thomas Singer & Paul Orbuch, W. Governors' Ass'n, Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: Potential Effects on State & Local Government pt. III(A)(2) (1997) (visited
Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/maiweb.htm>.
103. See id.
104. The principle may also be referred to as "market access" or "freedom of entry."
105. See Ganesan, supra note 94, at 17.
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the country they operate.10 6  This would largely constrain the
policymaking options of local governments, permitting them to develop
in only one direction: toward greater foreign investor protection.
iv. Prohibition on Performance Requirements
As sovereigns, governments often leverage their ability to deny
entry to foreign investors in order to extract investment commitments
for the benefit of local development needs. Heightened standards of
investor protection. however, exclude this possibility. A prohibition on
performance requirements, for example, prevents a government from
requiring foreign investors to hire local employees, use local resources,
transfer technology, develop local utilities and services, etc., as a
condition of an investment or of eligibility for investment incentives. 107
This, in effect, makes domestic governments passive receivers, rather
than active negotiators. of the externalities-both positive and
negative-of foreign investor undertakings within their jurisdictions.
v. Expanded Notions of Expropriation and Compensation
Under conventional notions of expropriation and compensation,
foreign investors are protected from expropriation or nationalization of
their assets by the host state. In the past, however, the principle has
been limited by narrowing the definitions of "-investment,"
"'expropriation, and "compensation."ic' Expanded notions of
expropriation and compensation, by contrast, protect investors from
government policies that are "tantamount to . . . expropriation."O09
Although this language is unprecedented, it could require governments
to compensate investors in circumstances where their policies merely
have an indirect or unintended impact on an investor's business,
including its future profitability. 10
106. See Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102. pt. III(A)(2).
107. See id. pt. IIIA)(5).
108. See UNCTAD. supra note 86. at 173-74. 191.
109. This definition is contained in NAFT-A. supra note 9. art. 1110(1), 32 I.L.M. at
641. The draft MLAI proposed to apply the principle to an expropriation or "any measure or
measures having similar effect." See Draft MAI, supra note 10, pt. TV. art. 2.1. According
to one trade lawyer, the draft MAT's provisions on expropriation -have broadened the
types of activity that will be considered as expropriations by including the words and
measures having equivalent effect. Any substantial interference with a property right is
likely an activity in the nature of expropriation and almost certainly a measure
tantamount to expropriation." Barry Appleton. The IMiAl and Canada's Health and Social
Service System. Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health
(Can.), para- 15 (Dec. 4. 1997) (on file with The Yale Human Rights and Development Law
Journal).
110. The government obligation to pay compensation can also be expanded by
widening the definition of investment to include intellectual property rights. portfolio
investment, or "all tangible and intangible property." The preliminary definition of
investment proposed under the draft MAT is particularly broad:
2000]
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vi. Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution
31 Heightened standards of investor protection also change the way
investors may challenge government policies that act to their
detriment. Under conventional mechanisms, known as state-to-state
dispute settlement, an investor whose rights have been violated must
appeal to its home government, which then has the option to pursue
enforcement of the investor's rights with the host government by
diplomatic or other means on the investor's behalf.11 Heightened
standards, by contrast, allow the foreign investor to claim compensation
directly from the host government before an international arbitration
panel. The investor-to-state dispute resolution greatly increases the
ability of foreign investors to directly influence host governments by
threatening suit for injunctive relief and substantial compensatory
damages in the absence of the sovereign immunity protections normally
ensured by domestic courts. 
112
vii. Standstill and Rollback Provisions
32 Standstill and rollback provisions also enhance the protections
afforded foreign investors. A standstill provision freezes any general
exceptions or country-specific reservations 1 3 to the agreement, by
prohibiting future government measures in the excepted area.11 4 A
2. Every investment means:
Every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an
investor, including:
(i) an enterprise...
(ii) shares, stocks or other forms of equity participation in
an enterprise, and rights derived therefrom;
(iii) bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and
rights derived therefrom;
(iv) rights under contracts, including turnkey, construction,
management, production or revenue-sharing contracts;
(v) claims to money and claims to performance;
(vi) intellectual property rights;
(vii) rights conferred pursuant to law or contract such as
concessions, licenses, authorizations, and permits;
(viii) any other tangible and intangible, movable and
immovable property, and any related property rights, such
as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges.
Draft MAI, supra note 10, pt. II, art. 2.
111. See Price, supra note 99, at 731.
112. Singer and Orbuch comment that the draft MAI provisions on investor-to-state
dispute settlement would "create rights that are not now available to foreign investors
through American statutes or case law." Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pts. I, III(C)(1).
113. General exceptions are negotiated to remove broad areas of government
lawmaking authority from the rules of an agreement for all country-members. Country-
specific reservations are negotiated to remove more specific areas of government
lawmaking authority from the rules of an agreement for a particular country-member. See
id. pt. III(B)(1).
114. This has been proposed in the draft MAI. See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FIscAL &
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rollback provision phases out exceptions or reservations to the
agreement over a period of time.115
B. Other Investment Agreements on Which an FTAA is Likely To Be
Based
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The FTAA represents only the latest manifestations of the push for 33
higher standards at the international level.116 In fact, higher standards
of investor protection have been negotiated in both bilateral and
multilateral agreements on investment. Since the 1960s, governments
have negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that apply
conventional principles of investor protection based on a narrow
definition of investment.117 The BIT negotiating pace has accelerated,
especially during the past ten years, and the more recent BITs have
tended to expand on earlier standards of investor protection.1 18 In fact,
much of the legal language of BITs entered into by the U.S. since the
early 1980s was used as a precedent for the NAFTA investment
provisions.1 19
2. NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)120 is a
flagship example of the push for higher standards of investor treatment
and protection at the international level, and has served as a precedent
ENTERPRISE AFF., OECD, COMMENTARY TO THE MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT pt. IX, art. 2
(1998) [hereinafter MAI COMMENTARY]; see also Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pts.
III(A)(5), III(B)(2); UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 194.
115. See MAI COMMENTARY, supra note 114, pt. IX. See also Singer & Orbuch, supra
note 102, pts. III(A)(5), III(B)(2).
116. Capital-exporting countries have continued of late to attempt to negotiate a
multilateral investment agreement under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.
Most developing countries, on the other hand, are against elaborating investment rules at
the WTO. See Implementation Issues: The Rocky Road to Seattle, BRIDGES BETWEEN
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD), Oct-Nov. 1999, at 1, available at <http://www.ictsd.
orgfhtmllarct_sd.htm>.
117. Conventional BITs usually recognize traditional standards of investor protection
such as national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, often qualified by a
number of exceptions. See UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 134. The aim of conventional BITs
is generally to provide "protection and equitable treatment of FDI after the investment
has taken place in consonance with the host countries' laws and regulations." Ganesan,
supra note 94, at 8.
118. By 1996, for instance, over two thirds of the roughly 1,100 BITs in existence had
been concluded in the 1990s. See UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 163.
119. David A. Gantz, Environmental "Takings" Under Chapter 11: Does NAFTA
Require Compensation for Environmental Protection?, Paper presented to the Canadian
Bar Association, Toronto, Canada (Mar. 2000) (on file with The Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal).
120. NAFTA, supra note 9.
2000]
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for other multilateral investment negotiations. 121 Although the NAFTA
deals with a range of legal and economic issues, its provisions on
investment are considered especially significant. 122 The NAFTA sets
high standards of investor protection by expanding the definitions of
investment and investor, granting a right of establishment in some
sectors, and prohibiting performance requirements. 123 Perhaps most
importantly, the NAFTA expands on standards of expropriation and
compensation, and allows investors to directly challenge government
policies under an investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism.
124
3. Multilateral Investment Agreements
35 The push for higher standards has also manifested itself at the
multilateral level. Although no comprehensive world agreement on
investment has yet been established, the issue has been "prominent on
the international policy agenda" for a number of years, according to the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 125 During the
Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations, the U.S. presented an
ambitious proposal for a multilateral investment agreement that was
121. As commentators have noted, "NAFTA set a precedent for the treatment of
performance requirements" that was adopted in proposals for an MAI. See Singer &
Orbuch, supra note 102, pt. III(A)(5). According to the Permanent Secretariat of the Latin
American Economic System, NAFTA is frequently considered "state of the art" for the
new generation of investment agreements. See SELA, Las Negociaciones Internacionales
Sobre la Inversion Extranjera [International Negotiations on Foreign Investment] pt. II(B)
n.17 (1997), available at <www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/sela/docs/spdredil8-97.htm>.
Price comments that Chapter 11 of NAFTA "ought to set a standard for further
multilateral and bilateral investment accords in the hemisphere." Price, supra note 99, at
736; see also Michael Gestrin & Alan M. Rugman, The NAFTA Investment Provisions:
Prototype for Multilateral Investment Rules?, in MARKET ACCESS AFTER THE URUGUAY
ROUND: INVESTMENT, COMPETITION AND TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 63-77 (Pierre Sauv6
& Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 1996).
122. The NAFTA provisions on investment are "one of [its] primary pillars," according
to H.H. Camp, Jr. & A.R. Kontrimas, Direct Investment Issues, in NAFTA AND BEYOND
87, 89 (J.J. Norton & T.L. Bloodworth eds., 1995). Appleton agrees that "in terms of
importance, these provisions constitute the very heart and soul of the NAFTA." BARRY
APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 79 (1994).
123. For instance, an investment is defined broadly under the NAFTA "to include
virtually all types of ownership interests, either direct or indirect, actual or contingent."
APPLETON, supra note 122, at 80. Since the definition of investment "delimits the scope" of
an investment agreement, a broad definition provides the basis for establishing broad
restrictions on the lawmaking authority of NAFTA governments. See SELA, supra note
121, pt. II(2)(a)(i).
124. NAFTA is the first international agreement providing for investor-state
arbitration into which Mexico has entered; it is also the first such agreement that two
OECD countries have entered into between themselves. See Price, supra note 99, at 731.
125. See UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 129. Discussion regarding a multilateral
investment agreement dates back to the Bretton Woods negotiations of the mid-1940s.
The high standards of investor treatment and protection currently on the table, however,
had been rejected by most governments until quite recently.
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rejected in the face of resistance from developing countries. 126
Negotiations were subsequently shifted to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD
negotiations toward a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
ended shortly, however, after France withdrew from the process in
October 1998, stating resolutely "it does not seem wise to allow private
interests to chew away at the sovereignty of states."127
C. Prospects for the FTAA
Despite the demise of the MAI, the push for higher standards of 36
investor protection continues in other international fora, including the
negotiations toward an FTAA.128 The end result of the FTAA
negotiations is, of course, a very open question. Some Latin American
governments, such as Brazil and Chile, may have serious concerns
about the degree to which higher standards would constrain their
domestic policy options. 129 Also, opposition to the push for higher
standards may have intensified within the U.S. Government following
the demise of the MAI. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade
126. See, e.g., B.B. Ramaiah, Towards a Multilateral Framework on Investment? 6
TRANSNAT'L CORP. 117 (1997). The World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) was limited to a relatively narrow range of
investment provisions. See SELA, supra note 121. pt. II n.68.
127. Council of Canadians, An Update on MA Negotiations: October 14, 1998 (visited
May 20, 2000) <http://www.canadians.org/> (publications, MAI) (quoting French Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin summing up the French decision to withdraw). For background on
France's withdrawal from the MAI, see Catherine Lalumibre et al., Ministry of the
Economy, Finance, and Industry (Fr.), France's Official Position on Withdrawing from the
MAiL Negotiations (Rapport sur lAccord multilatdral sur lVinvestissement (AMI)-Rapport
Intdrimaire) (Sept. 1998), available in English at <http://www.canadians.org/>
(publications, MAI).
128. At the Fourth Business Forum of the Americas in March 1998, the President and
CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce called for FTAA governments to conclude "a
hemispheric Convention on Investments, to take effect by the year 2000" to "establish
world-class protection for investors, including national treatment; full and free
repatriation of capital profits and dividends; a prohibition against performance
requirements; and protection against appropriation [sic]." Thomas J. Donohue, Free Trade
in the Americas: Why Business Must Take the Lead (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.
sice.oas.org/Ftaa/costa/orum/donohu-e.asp>.
129. For example, although almost every country in the western hemisphere has
signed at least one BIT, less than a third have committed to the higher threshold of
investor protection established in more recent BITs. See SELA, supra note 121, pt. II(A).
Salacuse suggests that compulsory arbitration provisions "may be the reason that so few
Latin American countries have signed BITs, since international arbitration conflicts with
the Calvo doctrine, an important element in the legal systems of most countries in the
region." Salacuse, supra note 85, at 672-73. Also, a Canadian government analysis was
reported as stating: "Keeping Brazil positively engaged in the Free Trade Area of the
Americas process ... and a 'millennium' round of multilateral trade negotiations may
prove increasingly difficult." Heather Scoffield, Crisis Hits Canadian Exports to Brazil,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 28, 1999, at B9 [hereinafter Crisis Hits]; see also Heather
Scoffield, North-South Split Shadows Trade Talks, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), April 18,
1998, at Al.
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Representative, for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
"is playing a larger role than might previously have been the case" in
U.S. preparations for FTAA negotiations "because of the agency's
concern over an individual government's right to issue regulations
without crossing over into an expropriation dispute."130 The comments
suggest apprehension on the part of the EPA about the impact of high
investment standards on the ability of governments to regulate
environmental matters. More broadly, the strong public opposition to
the MAI that has arisen in North America and elsewhere, as well as
events surrounding the recent Seattle ministerial meeting of the World
Trade Organization, may signal rough waters ahead for future FTAA
talks.
On the other hand, there remains a powerful momentum behind the
push for stronger investor protection. The U.S. Government, in
particular, has forcefully advanced the NAFTA investment provisions
as a prototype for the FTAA.131 Canada and Mexico have also reportedly
pushed for higher standards since committing to NAFTA.132 Investors
themselves have organized to support higher standards, holding annual
business forums alongside FTAA government meetings, for example.
On the whole, therefore, there is good reason to expect that the FTAA
investment negotiations may lead to the establishment of higher
standards of investor protection in the Americas, modeled after NAFTA,
or perhaps the draft MAI.
D. Investor-to-State Mechanism: Leveraging Democratic Accountability
The NAFTA investment provisions, contained in Chapter 11 of the
agreement, provide an important, if tentative, example of how higher
standards of investor protection have impacted government
decisionmaking. The NAFTA was the first multilateral agreement to
create an investor-to-state mechanism, described as "an untapped
source of extensive private-investor rights, including guaranteed access
130. SELA, U.S. Preparations for FTAA Negotiations (Oct. 1998) (visited Mar. 21,
2000) <http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/sela/engantena/engant49.htm>.
131. See VANGRASSTEK, supra note 85, at 19-21; Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric
Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 127-28 (1995); Richard Bernal, Jamaica and the Process of Free
Trade in the Western Hemisphere, in JAMAICA AFTER NAFTA: TRADE OPTIONS AND
SECTORAL STRATEGIES 19-20 (Anne Weston & Usha Viswanathan eds., 1998).
132. Mexico, in particular, recently concluded a free trade agreement with
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and already has free trade agreements with
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Canada is also in negotiations toward a bilateral trade and
investment deal with Costa Rica, and has reportedly pushed for an investment agreement
with Mercosur. as well as other Central American countries, including Guatemala. See
News From the Regions: The Americas, BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.
(ICTSD), June 1999, at 8, available at <http://www.ictsd.org/htmlweekly/story5.07-06-O0.
htm>; Heather Scoffield, Canada, Mercosur Agree on Framework, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), June 17, 1998, at B7; Heather Scoffield, Canada, Costa-Rica to Begin Formal
Bilateral Trade Talks, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 1, 2000, at B1, B13.
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to a NAFTA panel for a private party."133 Under Chapter 11, an investor
may avoid domestic courts, and thus sovereign immunity issues, by
directly challenging a government before a NAFTA arbitration panel,
where consent of the home country is not needed. 134 Chapter 11
disputes are heard and resolved by international arbitration panels,
made up of experts in fields like international commerce, finance,
industry, and law. 135 Perhaps most significantly, NAFTA panel
decisions are insulated from judicial review in domestic courts. 136
The great portent of the investor-to-state mechanism is that it
allows individual investors to launch their own international legal
claims against states. According to one international arbitration lawyer,
Cheri Eklund, Chapter 11 represents "a remarkable step" since it
"transfers control over the incidence and conduct of investor disputes
from the [NAFTA] Parties to private persons."'1 7 Eklund suggests that
the rules are so favorable to investors that it is "inconceivable that an
investor would elect to litigate a Chapter Eleven dispute before a
national court."138 These comments reveal the potential that exists for
investors to apply Chapter 11, or a similar FTAA mechanism, to
advance their positions in new ways vis- -vis domestic governments.
How have investors applied these new rights? To date, at least 40
thirteen NAFTA lawsuits have been initiated in response to a diverse
range of government policies in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. The
impugned policies have included a phase-out of a gasoline additive, a
ban on exports of PCBs, the creation of an ecological preserve, a jury
damages award, a bilateral agreement on softwood lumber exports, a
mall deal gone bad, a banana gasoline additive, and a moratorium on
water exports. 139 In each case, investors have argued that the policies
133. Appleton, supra note 109, text accompanying n.23, quoting G.N. Horlick & A.L.
Marti, NAFTA Chapter 11B, A Private Right of Action to Enforce Market Access Through
Investments, 14 J. INT'LARB. 54 (1997).
134. See NAFTA, supra note 9, ch.11, art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643; see also Cheri D.
Eklund, A Primer on the Arbitration of NAFTA Chapter Eleven Investor-State Disputes,
11 J. INT'L ARB. 135, 135 (1994); Price, supra note 99, at 731-35.
135. See Eklund, supra note 134, at 150.
136. See id. at 140, 146.
137. Id. at 135.
138. Id. at 157.
139. See, e.g., Heather Scoffield, NAFTA Lawsuits Cloud MAl Discussions, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 24, 1998, at B2; Barry McKenna, Loewen Action Called a Threat to
U.S. Justice, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 25, 1998, at B5; Heather Scoffield, B.C. Water
Export Ban Brings U.S. Lawsuit, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 9, 1998, at BI; William
Glaberson, NAFTA Invoked to Challenge Court Award, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at C6;
Crisis Hits, supra note 129; Heather Scoffield, Ottawa Thought Debate Ended Five Years
Ago, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 11, 1999, at A14; Eric Reguly, Water Tap Will Be
Hard to Shut Off, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 16, 1999, at B2; Heather Scoffield,
Another U.S. Firm Sues Ottawa Under NAFTA, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 16, 1999,
at Bi; Heather Scoffield, Mexico, Canada At Odds on NAFTA Rule Changes, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 19, 1999, at B2 [hereinafter Mexico, Canada at Odds]; Evelyn
Iritani, Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al;
Heather Scoffield, Quebec Real Estate Company Sues U.S. Government, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Sept. 28, 1999, at B4; Heather Scoffield, Methanex Set to Sue Uncle Sam under
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violated the investment principles established under NAFTA, and that
they were entitled to direct state compensation for the harm suffered. 140
41 The full significance of the NAFTA investor-to-state mechanism has
been the subject of great debate. Critics claim that Chapter 11 gives
investors unwarranted leverage over political decisionmaking, allowing
them to interfere with the ability of elected governments to implement
legitimate public policies.141 They have warned of a "chill effect" on
government policymakers faced with the threat of an investor
challenge. 142 Other commentators counter that the breadth of the
NAFTA investment provisions is in fact much more narrow, and that
NAFTA panels will respect the legitimate authority of governments. 143
NAFTA Over Gas Additive, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 3, 1999, at B7; Heather
Scoffield, UPS sues Ottawa in subsidy dispute, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 18, 2000, at
B1 [hereinafter UPS Sues Ottawa].
140. Only one of the investor challenges has actually been decided by a NAFTA
arbitration panel, and that challenge was dismissed on both the facts before the panel and
on a "credibility gap" that adhered to DESONA, the investor making the claim. The
challenge involved a decision by municipal authorities to revoke a permit allowing
DESONA to pick up waste in a Mexico City suburb. See Robert Azinian v. United Mexican
States, 14 ICSID REV. 538, 572-74 (1999); see also Heather Scoffield, Mexico Wins
NAFTA Decision, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 5, 1999, at B7.
141. See, e.g., TONY CLARKE & MAUDE BARLOW, MAI-THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1997)
[hereinafter MAI THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY]; TONY CLARKE & MAUDE BARLOW, MAI
ROUND 2-NEw GLOBAL AND INTERNAL THREATS TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1998);
Jackson, supra note 89; MARK VALLIANATOS, LICENSE TO LOOT (1998). See also Gloria L.
Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A
Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Critical
Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L.REV. 303 (1996-97); Special Comm. on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, Legislative Assembly of British Columbia (Can.), First Report (Dec. 29, 1998),
available at <www.legis.gov.bc.ca/cmt/mai/1998/lreport/index.htm> [hereinafter BC
Special Comm.].
142. As Clarke & Barlow note with respect to challenges under an investor-state
dispute resolution:
[T]hese mechanisms would not have to be fully exercised to have their
desired effect. The fact that corporations would have these weapons at
their disposal, coupled with the threat (implied or otherwise) to use
them against governments, could generate considerable political
clout.... There are likely dozens of lesser-known cases where
corporations have used the threat of these tools to shape and
determine government policy decisions.
MAI THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 141, at 42.
143. To illustrate the debate: in hearings on the FTAA before a Canadian
Parliamentary subcommittee, two trade law experts took rather divergent positions on
the potential impact of Chapter 11. On the one hand, law professor Robert Howse
commented that investor claims to date "arise out of an unreasonable or, to put it
charitably, very speculative interpretation of the legal language of NAFTA" and that
there is no "accepted definition of expropriation or taking of property just because some
business loses revenues due to the government changing some general public policy." On
the other hand, trade lawyer Howard Mann argued that Chapter 11 has become "an
offensive weapon, a lobbying weapon, a strategic tool that any form of corporation has
virtually unfettered access to" in order "to challenge public policy making, public
regulation making, and public welfare activity in the normal course of government .... "
Canadian Interests in Negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas: Comprehensive
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Indeed, much of the legal language is broadly-drafted and
unprecedented in international law, and thus awaits interpretation by
NAFTA panels on a case-by-case basis.144 The bottom line appears to be
that the implications of the NAFTA investment provisions will remain
uncertain for years to come, and may potentially be revolutionary from
a legal point of view.' 45
Of course, this uncertainty has not prevented investors from using 42
Chapter 11 to challenge government policies. In some cases, the mere
threat of a lawsuit has reportedly caused governments to reconsider
proposed policies. 46 In one prominent case of an actual NAFTA lawsuit,
a U.S.-based company sued the Canadian government after it banned
the import and inter-provincial sale of a gasoline additive manufactured
by the company. The Canadian government settled the claim by
agreeing to drop its ban, pay a multi-million dollar damage settlement,
and issue a public statement disclaiming its previous finding that the
additive was a threat to the environment and human health. 147 Further,
Public Hearings on the FTAA Before the Sub-Comm. on Intl Trade, Trade Disputes, and
Investment (House of Commons, Can.) (Jun. 9, 1999) (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.
parl.gc.calInfoComDoc/36/l/SINT/Meetings/Evidence/sintev33-e.htm> [hereinafter House
of Commons Testimony] (statements of Robert Howse & Howard Mann).
144. NAFTA language, for example, goes beyond simple expropriation to include acts
"tantamount to... expropriation." NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
NAFTA does not define what constitutes the latter, thus leaving the issue up to an
arbitral panel in cases where the host state and a NAFTA investor disagree. See, e.g.,
APPLETON, supra note 122, at 86. According to trade lawyer Larry Herman, "Chapter 11
has potentially broad reach. No one knows how far it extends." UPS sues Ottawa, supra
note 139. Mann goes on to state that "[t]he drafting of these obligations today is far too
broad and leaves essentially every single public policy measure open to challenge, and in
a very easy way." House of Commons Testimony, supra note 143 (statement of Howard
Mann).
145. With reference to the MAI investor-to-state mechanism, Stumberg notes that
"none of us today can predict how the MAI dispute panels are going to resolve disputes
about the agreement.... What we can say is that ... the law in question will be the MAI
text and international law . . . not the constitutional law of your country." BC Special
Comm., supra note 141, pt. II (testimony of Robert Stumberg).
146. Foreign investors have reportedly threatened Chapter 11 lawsuits in opposition
to government policies, and, in a number of such cases, the policies were subsequently
altered or abandoned. The reported cases include proposals for public auto insurance,
mandatory plain cigarette packaging, restrictions on advertising in split-run magazines,
and renegotiation of an airport privatization contract. See MAI THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 141, at 42; Bruce Campbell, Free Trade: Year 3, 26 CANADIAN DIMENSION 5, 7
(1992); House of Commons Testimony, supra note 143.
147. The Government of Canada agreed last year to settle a US$250 million NAFTA
lawsuit launched by Ethyl Corporation, based in Richmond, Virginia. Ethyl had
challenged Canada under Chapter 11 after the federal government banned the import or
inter-provincial sale of the gasoline additive MMT, which is manufactured by the
company. The Canadian Government claimed at the time that MMT was an
environmental hazard because it gums up automobile emission controls. Ethyl responded
with an investor challenge under NAFTA, seeking compensation for, among other claims,
lost profits, damage to its assets and loss of the value expropriation of its assets, and
damage to its reputation. Under the settlement, the Government agreed to drop its MMT
ban, pay Ethyl $19 million for legal costs and lost profits, and issue a public statement
that the gasoline additive is not a threat to the environment or human health. In return,
Ethyl agreed to drop the NAFTA challenge. Since the settlement, Canada has reportedly
31
Harten: Guatemala's Peace Accords in a Free Trade Area of the Americas
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 3:113
despite the uncertainty surrounding the full significance of Chapter 11,
trade negotiators from the OECD governments proposed an expanded
investor-to-state mechanism under the MAI. The same may occur in the
FTAA negotiations, although this will likely depend on how the panel
interpretations of Chapter 11 unfold in the investor challenges initiated
to date. On the whole, there is a real prospect that the FTAA
governments will conclude an agreement on investment, and that its
impact will be to enhance foreign investors' ability to influence a gamut
of domestic policy issues, by means of strategic reference to the threat of
an investor-to-state challenge.
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AN FTAA ON THE GUATEMALAN PEACE
PROCESS
43 Despite the centrality of land in the Guatemalan context,
prospective Government policies on agrarian reform, stemming from
the peace accords, could run afoul of high standards of investor
protection under an FTAA investment agreement. In particular, an
investor could challenge the policies, and demand compensation for its
losses, on the grounds that they violate broad notions of national
treatment, prohibitions on performance requirements, and protections
from expropriation. Potentially, then, the FTAA could serve to derail
the Guatemalan peace process by constraining the ability of the
government to fulfill its commitments under the accords.
44 This section aims to demonstrate the rationale behind this forecast
of potential conflict, and the types of arguments that an investor could
use to challenge various Government policies undertaken pursuant to
the peace accords. In particular, it explores some of the arguments that
an investor could make in challenging Government policies on land
stemming from the accords. Other commentators have attempted to
anticipate the impact of proposed investment agreements in this way,
especially in the case of the draft MAI.14s The analysis in this Article is
modeled, in particular, on the approach adopted in a 1997 report on the
MAI prepared for the U.S. Western Governors' Association (WGA).
According to the authors of the WGA report:
Our approach is to rely not only on the stated intent of MAI
negotiators, but to anticipate how the language of MAI
asked Mexico and the U.S. to agree to clarify the scope of the NAFTA rules on investment,
withou t success. See Shawn McCarthy, Threat of NAFTA Case Kills Canada's MMT Ban,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 20, 1998, at Al; Shawn McCarthy, Gas War: The Fall and
Rise of MMT, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 24, 1998, at Al; Heather Scoffield,
Controversial NAFTA Chapter Lets Companies Sue Governments, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Dec. 21, 1999, at B15; Mexico, Canada At Odds, supra note 139, at B2.
148. See, e.g., Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102; Appleton, supra note 109; Garry T.
Neil, Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and Canada's Cultural Sector,
Unpublished report prepared for the Canadian Conference of the Arts (Oct. 15, 1997) (on
file with The Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal).
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proposals might be interpreted by future dispute panels or
courts in response to legal claims brought by investors. This
approach is necessary because a core purpose of the MAI is to
legally empower investors to seek their own remedies and make
their own arguments against state laws without mediation by
their home governments. 149
I note that the analysis here is based on a number of critical 45
assumptions about the FTAA. For one, it assumes that an FTAA would
establish high standards of investor treatment and protection, modeled
after the NAFTA and the draft MAI. In other words, the analysis
assumes that an FTAA would include broad definitions of investment
and investor, an investor right of establishment, a prohibition on
performance requirements, broad notions of expropriation and
compensation, and an investor-to-state mechanism. The analysis also
assumes that an FTAA investment agreement would apply to the
Guatemalan peace accords without any exceptions.150 Finally, I note
that the aim of the analysis is to provide some examples, rather than an
exhaustive review, of prospective investor challenges to Government
policies concerning land issues. For this reason, the Article provides
only a tentative tip-of-the-iceberg assessment of the potential impact of
an FTAA investment agreement. Clearly, actual investor arguments
would be driven by the particular facts of a given investor-state dispute,
including the specific structure of the impugned government policy.
It is also important to point out that Guatemalan citizens and 46
companies might also be able qualify as foreign investors under an
FTAA investor-to-state mechanism and thereby gain the right to
challenge their own government for violations of FTAA standards. A
Guatemalan citizen might gain access to the investor-to-state
mechanism, for instance, by obtaining ownership interests in a foreign
149. Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pt. IV.
150. It is conceivable that an FTAA investment agreement could contain exceptions
that shelter some areas of government policy from the impact of high standards of
investor protection. For example, the agreement might apply the standard of national
treatment only in the post-establishment phases of an investment, and thus not create a
right of establishment. More significantly, the agreement might state explicitly and
broadly that its provisions do not apply to any government policies designed to implement
commitments under the peace accords. Alternatively, the agreement might include a
general exception to shelter all government policies dealing with land reform (for example)
from the impact of the agreement. Finally, the agreement might permit Guatemala to
claim specific reservations for certain commitments under the peace accords. For
discussion of various forms of exceptions, see SELA, supra note 121, pt. III(B)(2);
UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 184.
In all of these cases, the relevant wording in the agreement would be critical since
exceptions tend to be interpreted narrowly by dispute resolution bodies. Also, an
exception might still permit investors to challenge government policies under an investor-
to-state provision, or place the onus on governments to establish that a policy fell within
an excepted area. Further, any exceptions in an FTAA investment agreement might be
limited by "standstill" or "rollback" provisions. See generally UNCTAD, supra note 86, at
194; Ganesan, supra note 94, at 17-18.
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company operating in Guatemala. In order to qualify as a "foreign"
investor, an astute Guatemalan landowner might form a corporation in
the U.S. (or another FTAA country), with himself as the controlling
shareholder, and transfer ownership of his assets to the foreign
corporation. Alternatively, a Guatemalan investor could arrange for
joint ownership, with a foreign investor, of its local assets. These
options, as well as other innovative legal strategies, could provide
Guatemalan investors with access to an FTAA investor-to-state
mechanism, in order to challenge the policies of their home
government. 151
4., The following analysis considers how investors could potentially
challenge each of the government commitments on land considered in
Part I(B), including specific policies to facilitate access to land and
encourage its productive use; to resolve land conflicts and provide
security of land tenure; and to promote indigenous land rights.
A. Policies to Facilitate Access to Land and Encourage Productive Use
of Land
1. Land Trust Fund
48 Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Guatemalan Government
agrees to create a land trust fund designed to facilitate campesino
access to land.152 This commitment took further shape in July 1997,
when the Joint Commission on Indigenous Land Rights, formed under
the Indigenous Accord,153 submitted a detailed bill to Congress
proposing a law to establish a land trust fund. The proposed fund was
designed to benefit campesinos without land, campesinos living in
poverty, and campesinos with insufficient land based on criteria of the
size and soil quality of land owned, relative to basic family needs.
54
Eligibility would be further restricted to "Guatemalans"; consequently,
151. I acknowledge that some of these scenarios may not be probable, although they
are certainly possible. All of them would of course depend on the wording and
interpretation of the agreement.
152. In particular, the Government commits to "[e]stablish a land trust fund... to
provide credit and to promote savings, preferably among micro-, small and medium-sized
enterprises. The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the acquisition of land
through Government funding." Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, art. 34(a).
153. The Joint Commission was created under the Indigenous Accord "to study, devise
and propose appropriate institutional arrangements and procedures" to carry out the
commitments on land rights in the accord. It is made up of an equal number of
representatives from Government and indigenous organizations, and adopts its
conclusions by consensus. See Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pts. IV(F)(10), V(a), V(d).
154. See Anteproyecto de Ley del Fondo de Tierras, presentado por la Comisi6n
Paritaria sobre Derechos Relativos a la Tierra de los Pueblos Indigenas al Congreso de la
Repiblica de Guatemala [Land Fund Law Bill, presented by the Joint Commission on
Indigenous Land Rights to the Guatemalan Congress], tit.IV, ch. I, art. 21 (July 1998)
[hereinafter Joint Commission Proposal].
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foreigners would not be eligible. 155
Based on the provisions of an FTAA agreement, an investor could 49
potentially challenge the establishment of the proposed land trust fund
by arguing that it is a violation of national treatment to limit eligibility
to Guatemalans. As such, the investors could argue that foreign
investors suffer discrimination because they are denied benefits made
available to their domestic counterparts, and are entitled to
compensation from the Government for losses stemming from this
discriminatory treatment.
2. Redistribution of Undeveloped Lands
Under the proposals for a land trust fund, the Government is 50
authorized to facilitate access to land by redistributing undeveloped
land that it has acquired under Article 40 of the Guatemalan
Constitution. Article 40 provides that "[i]n concrete cases, private
property may be expropriated for reasons of collective utility, social
benefit or public interest, duly proven. .... 156 Thus, under the peace
accords, the Government has the power to expropriate undeveloped
private land in order to redistribute it to landless and land poor
campesinos.
If the Government acted on its powers under Article 40 to claim
undeveloped lands for redistribution, an investor whose assets were
diminished in value as a result of the expropriation could argue that it
is entitled to compensation. Under broadened definitions of
expropriation and compensation, such compensation might be found to
include the lost value of the land itself in cases where the investor
owned the land directly. It might also include the lost value of agri-
business contracts breached by local producers who owned the land.
Finally, it might include the lost value of rights granted to a foreign
investor under a previous concession, license or permit to exploit
natural resources on the expropriated lands. In each of these cases, the
investor could also argue that compensation includes the lost value of
the investor's opportunities for future profit. Even the threat of
bringing such a potentially bankrupting claim before an arbitration
panel would likely be enough to dissuade a state from exercising its
constitutional powers to fulfill its land commitments under the peace
accords.
3. Land Tax
The Government further agrees under the Socio-Economic Accord to 52
establish a land tax designed to encourage the productive use of land by
taxing undeveloped and under-utilized lands that are over a certain size
155. Joint Commission Proposal, supra note 154, art. 21.
156. GUATE. CONST. art. 40 (author's translation).
2000]
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at a higher rate of taxation. 157
A foreign investor might challenge the imposition of such a tax
under the principles of national treatment, particularly as broadened by
the effects test. Under national treatment, a land tax could not apply
higher levies to foreign investors; this would constitute direct
discrimination against foreign investors in violation of conventional
international investment law. More broadly, a foreign investor could
argue that a land tax directed at large-landowners might have indirect
discriminatory effects and thereby violate expanded notions of national
treatment. To illustrate, a land tax designed to encourage productive
use of arable land would likely apply higher rates of taxation to large
plantations or underused lands. These modes of land ownership tend to
be prevalent in the agro-export sector, where foreign investors are, in
many cases, more likely to own land or do business. As a result, a land
tax targeting these lands would have a disproportionate and therefore
discriminatory effect on foreign investors, and thus violate broad
notions of national treatment.
5Finally, the FTAA might not exempt taxation from provisions on
expropriation. 158 If no exemption were made, the Government might
have to pay compensation to an investor for increasing the tax rate on
the investor's assets. In essence, this would make foreign investors
immune from certain types of tax hikes, since a government would have
to pay back any additional tax revenue as compensation for the
expropriation. 
1 5 9
B. Policies to Resolve Land Conflicts and Provide Security of Land
Tenure
1. Land Registry
Under the Socio-Economic Accord, the Government commits to
regulate land ownership by creating a comprehensive land registry,
described as "a juridical framework governing land ownership that is
157. See Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, art. 42 (providing that the Government
will promote "the legislation and mechanisms for the application ... of a land tax in the
rural areas .... The tax, from which small properties will be exempt, will help to
discourage ownership of undeveloped land and underutilization of land").
158. Regarding the MAI provisions on expropriation, most country delegations
supported inclusion of the following additional statement in the Interpretive Note to the
agreement: '"AT Parties understand that no taxation measures of the Parties effective at
the time of signature of the Agreement could be considered as expropriatory or having the
equivalent effect of expropriation." Some delegations were not in a position to associate
themselves with such a statement, however. See MAI COMMENTARY, supra note 114, pt.
VIII(1); see also Martin Khor, The MAL and Developing Countries, in DISMANTLING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 89, at 281.
159. See, e.g., Singer & Orbuch, supra note 102, pt. III(D)(4) ("[fH]eavy tax burdens
can be attacked as expropriation.").
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secure, simple and accessible to the entire population."'160 The
Government further commits to "apply flexible judicial or non-judicial
procedures for the settlement of disputes relating to land and other
natural resources."'161
In the process of resolving land conflicts and developing a land 56
registry, the Government might be forced to make a determination of
ownership amidst conflicting claims. If a determination worked against
a foreign investor, the investor could argue that the criteria used to
resolve competing claims to land ownership was discriminatory. In so
doing, the investor would have to demonstrate that the criteria created
some direct or indirect advantage for Guatemalans. This might occur,
for example, if the criteria gave preference to historical claims to the
land over more recent claims, since investors are probably less likely
than Guatemalans to hold long-standing historical claims to disputed
lands. Finally, an investor could argue that an unfavorable resolution of
a land dispute was "tantamount to expropriation" if the resolution of
the dispute caused a reduction in the value of the investor's assets
connected to the land area in question.
2. Communal Land Ownership
The Government commits under the Indigenous Accord to 57
"regularize the legal situation with regard to the communal possession
of lands by communities that do not have the title deeds to those lands"
including "measures to award title to municipal or national lands with a
clear communal tradition.' 162 The Government further commits under
the Socio-Economic Accord to "[p]rotect common and municipal land, in
particular by limiting to a strict minimum the cases in which it can be
transferred or handed over in whatever form to private individuals."'
163
One might assume that only Guatemalan communities, and 58
primarily Mayan communities, would be in a position to demonstrate
the "clear communal tradition" required for recognition of communal
land ownership. If so, the benefits of a Government policy to recognize
communal land ownership would flow disproportionately (or
exclusively) to Guatemalans. An investor could argue that this
effectively discriminates against foreign investors and violates national
treatment.
In addition, the Government might restrict the entitlement of so
private individuals to own common and municipal land. This could be
160. Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(a). The Accord further provides
that "the Government undertakes to promote legislative changes that would make it
possible to establish an efficient decentralized multi-user land registry system ....
Likewise, the Government undertakes to initiate .. .the process of land surveying and
systematizing the land register information." Id. para. 38.
161. Id. para. 37(f).
162. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(5) (emphasis added).
163. Socio-Economic Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(d).
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challenged by a foreign investor as a violation of the right of
establishment since investors would be prevented from owning (and
establishing themselves to do business on) common and municipal land.
In such cases, an investor could claim compensation for the lost profit it
would otherwise have gained if permitted to own common and
municipal land without restriction.
3. Reinstatement or Compensation for Usurped Lands
60 The Government further commits under the Socio-Economic Accord
to reinstate lands or compensate their former owners in cases where the
land "has been usurped or has been allocated in an irregular or
unjustified manner involving abuse of authority."'
164
61 An investor could challenge this intervention if the Government
reinstated usurped land that the investor had come to own. For
example, land usurped by a large Guatemalan landowner during the
conflict of the 1980s might have been sold or transferred to a foreign
investor. Indeed, the land might have been transferred by a
Guatemalan landowner to a foreign corporation owned by the
landowner, thus potentially qualifying him as a foreign investor. In
either case, the investor could demand Government payment to
compensate for the value of the usurped land that has been restored to
its former owners.
C. Policies to Promote and Protect Indigenous Land Rights
1. Indigenous Access to Traditional Lands
62 In terms of indigenous rights to land, the Government commits
under the Indigenous Accord to recognize and guarantee:
the right of access to lands and resources which are not occupied
exclusively by communities but to which the latter have
historically had access for their traditional activities and their
subsistence (rights of way, such as passage, wood-cutting,
access to springs, etc., and use of natural resources) and for
their spiritual activities.
1 6 5
63 If the Government recognized special indigenous rights of access to
traditional lands, this would potentially violate national treatment.
Such rights would provide preferential treatment to Guatemalan
citizens-in this case to the members of an indigenous community-and
164. Id. para. 37(f)(ii).
165. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(6)(a).
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thus discriminate against foreign investors. 166
In addition, the Joint Commission on indigenous land rights 64
proposed that indigenous sacred sites should be "carved out" of lands
delivered under the land trust fund, and held in public ownership.1 67 In
cases where the Government granted special indigenous rights of access
to portions of an investor's land, the investor could argue that it is
entitled to compensation on the basis that such access is "tantamount to
expropriation" of the land. Thus, if an indigenous sacred site was
"carved out" of an investor's land to guarantee indigenous access to the
site, the investor might be entitled to compensation for the lost value of
the land "carved out." Again, the mere threat of investor challenges over
such issues is likely to deter government attempts to fulfill its
commitments under the two land-related accords.
2. Indigenous Rights over Natural Resources
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government further commits to 65
"[r]ecognize and guarantee the right of communities to participate in
the use, administration and conservation of the natural resources
existing in their lands." 168 To carry out these commitments, the
Government might grant a degree of authority over local natural
resources to the local community. In such cases, an investor could argue
that the local community is a form of subnational government, and is
thus bound by the same standards of investor treatment and protection
as other levels of Guatemalan government. Similarly, the investor could
argue that the "customary norms" of indigenous communities are also
bound by the same restrictions, since they are given legal force by the
166. An exception for the Sami indigenous people regarding the local use of resources
by indigenous peoples was proposed by the Scandinavian countries in negotiations
towards the MAI. The exception proposed that "exclusive rights to reindeer husbandry
within traditional Sami areas may be granted to the Sami people" and that the exception
"may be extended to take account of any further development of exclusive Sami rights
linked to their traditional means of livelihood." See Draft MAI, supra note 10, Annex I, at
133; see also Ovide Mercredi, The MI and the First Nations, in DISMANTLING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 89, at 78, 82.
167. See Joint Commission Proposal, supra note 154, art. 39, which provides:
When with respect to the plantations acquired by means of the
mechanism of the Lands Fund it is determined and recognized, by the
indigenous communities neighboring the plantation, that traditional
places exist for ceremonial purposes, the segment of land where the
ceremonial place is located will be detached from the plantation ....
Id. (author's translation).
168. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(6)(b). The Government also commits
under the Socio-Economic Accord "to regulate participation by communities in order to
ensure that it is they who take the decisions relating to their land." Socio-Economic
Accord, supra note 8, para. 37(e). Further, the Government commits under the Indigenous
Accord to promote legal recognition of "the right of indigenous communities to manage
their own internal affairs in accordance with their customary norms provided that the
latter are not incompatible with the fundamental rights defined by the national legal
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authority residing in Guatemalan national or subnational governments.
If the policies of a community violated the standards of investor
treatment and protection contained in an investment agreement, an
investor could argue that either the community itself or the national
government must pay compensation.
66 The Government also commits under the Indigenous Accord to
recognize indigenous rights to approve "any project for the exploitation
of natural resources which might affect the subsistence and way of life
of the communities" and to receive "fair compensation for any loss
which they may suffer as a result of these activities." 169 In light of these
provisions, it is possible that a community might restrict participation
in resource development projects on local lands to members of the
community, so as to retain some of the economic benefits of the project
within the community. An investor could challenge this restriction as a
violation of national treatment, since it discriminates in favor of
members of the community, and against foreign investors. The investor
could also challenge the restriction as a violation of the right of
establishment, if the investor was effectively barred from establishing
operations in the local community.
67 Additionally, a community might go so far as to reject a proposal for
a resource development project. If an investor had received previous
approval for the project from another level of government, such as a
concession, license, or permit to exploit natural resources, the investor
could claim compensation for the expropriation of the lost business
opportunity.
68 Finally, given an FTAA prohibition on performance requirements,
investors would be protected from community requirements that the
investor hire a certain proportion of local employees, process resources
locally, or do business with local enterprises, as conditions of
investment.
3. Affirmative Action for Indigenous Women
69 The Government also commits under the Indigenous Accord to
"[e]liminate any form of discrimination against women, in fact or in law,
with regard to facilitating access to land . ,,170 This could conceivably
be interpreted as a mandate for affirmative action programs to make up
for the historical disadvantage faced by indigenous women in terms of
land ownership and access to land.
70 An investor could challenge affirmative action programs for
indigenous women as a violation of national treatment. Affirmative
action to make up for historical discrimination suffered by indigenous
women entails contemporary discrimination against foreign investors.
An investor could further argue that a Government requirement that it
169. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(6)(c).
170. Id. pt. IV(F)(9)(g).
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give preference to indigenous women in its hiring or contracting
decisions is a prohibited performance requirement.171
4. Indigenous Land Claims Settlements
Under the Indigenous Accord, the Government further recognizes
"the particularly vulnerable situation of the indigenous communities,
which have historically been the victims of land plundering" and
commits "to institute proceedings to settle the claims to communal
lands formulated by the communities and to restore or pay
compensation for those lands."172
An investor could sue for compensation if a settlement to an 2
indigenous land claim reduced the value of the investor's assets
connected to the indigenous traditional lands. 173 An investor could also
claim compensation if the resolution of an indigenous land claim
prevented or delayed the investor in its efforts to carry out a planned
resource development project.
The Indigenous Accord includes a wide range of other Government 73
commitments to promote indigenous linguistic, cultural, civil, political,
social, and economic rights.174 An investor could challenge the
preferential treatment for indigenous people that is inherent in the
recognition and protection of indigenous rights, arguing that it
discriminates against (non-indigenous) foreign investors, and thus
violates national treatment.
175
171. Under NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States reserved "the right to
adopt or maintain any measure according rights or preferences to socially or economically
disadvantaged minorities" from the impact of national treatment and the prohibition on
performance requirements. See NAFTA, supra note 9, 32 I.L.M. at 749, 754, 756-57.
172. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pt. IV(F)(7). The Government will further
promote measures "to ensure recognition, the awarding of title, protection, recovery,
restitution and compensation for those rights." Id. pt. IV(F)(1).
173. In terms of the aboriginal land claims process in Canada, the Government of
British Columbia stated in a 1997 submission on the MAI:
To take a current, complex and highly sensitive issue-if the
settlement of an Aboriginal land claim involves depriving third parties
of property interests covered under the broad MAI definition, then, if
that third party is a foreign-affiliated investor, it could seek full
compensation under the investor-state provisions of the MAI ....
Consequently, the MAI could expose governments to increased costs
and, by providing foreign-affiliated investors with a unilateral option
to go to binding international arbitration, could adversely change the
dynamics of land claim settlement negotiations.
Gov't of British Columbia, Submission to The House of Commons Sub-Committee on
International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investment regarding the proposed Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with author).
174. Indigenous Accord, supra note 7, pts. I-IV.
175. Under NAFTA, Canada reserved "the right to adopt or maintain any measure
denying investors of another Party and their investments, or service providers of another
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IV. CONCLUSION
4 This Article has attempted to show that a range of Guatemalan
Government policies on land, stemming from commitments contained in
the peace accords, could conflict with broad notions of investor
treatment and protection under an FTAA. At the very least, investors-
e.g., landowners, agribusiness companies, and resource development
firms-could challenge all of the prospective reforms outlined above by
strategically resorting to an FTAA investor-to-state claim,17 6 It may be
that not all of the investor arguments I have outlined would be
successful before an international arbitration panel. In many cases,
however, they would not have to be. The mere threat of an investor
challenge would no doubt cause a Guatemalan government, facing
costly litigation and the prospect of a substantial damages award, to
think twice before pursuing errant policies. It is this climate of risk, in
the face of the uncertainty generated under an FTAA, that would
effectively increase the weight afforded to the priorities of investors
relative to other social groups in the process of political decisionmaking
that surrounds implementation of the peace accords. It may be, in fact,
that an overarching purpose of the FTAA is to insure that the process of
reform and democratization in Guatemala does not get out of hand from
an investor's point of view, regardless of any consequent smothering of
the peace accords.
,5 These observations go to the heart of criticisms of the new push for
higher standards of investor protection. Critics have argued that
investment agreements like the NAFTA and the draft MAI will prevent
elected governments from pursuing legitimate policies in the public
interest. According to Ricardo Grinspun and Robert Kreklewich, the
real purpose of "free trade" is to apply a long-term "conditioning
framework" to the policy options available to governments, and to "lock
in" neoliberal reforms. 177  Further, the "essence of this new
conditionality" is "to restrict choice at the national level and to impose
policies against the will of people, but in a disguised manner."
17 8
76 Some proponents of stronger investor protection outwardly express
their intention to reduce the policy options available to future elected
176. According to one commentary on the draft MAI, an investor-to-state mechanism
"is likely to result in investors carefully scrutinizing government practices to find a MAI
provision on which they can base a claim." Appleton. supra note 109, para. 24.
177. A conditioning framework is "an institutional mechanism that effectively
restricts policy choices at the nation-state level," which "becomes binding due to
international constraints and obligations incurred to another country, to foreign
corporations, foreign investors, or to a multilateral agency." Grinspun & Kreklewich,
supra note 95, at 36. Free trade agreements represent a "higher level" of constraint, on
top of other formal constraints such as the imposition of IMF conditionality in the context
of debt crisis. One important difference between the two is that IMF conditionality is
usually temporary (3-5 years), whereas free trade agreements are intended to be
permanent. Id. at 39, 41.
178. Id. at 40.
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governments in the face of a liberalized hemispheric economy. The
Latin American Economic System (SELA), for example, has commented
that the trend toward the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) in Latin America "has contributed to 'lock' the adopted reforms
inasmuch as their reversal is now more difficult."17 9 SELA also reports
that an FTAA investment agreement "could play an important role for
governments" by acting as "a deterrent to [future governments] later
making changes in the liberalization process."18 0
Thus, although framed in the narrow context of the rules of 77
international investment, the full impact of an FTAA investment
agreement extends deep into the realm of public policy. According to
Grinspun and Kreklewich, "[t]he new trading arrangements effectively
remove many economic and social policy objectives from democratic
consideration," and "[t]he outcome, if unchallenged, will be a narrower
set of societal choices; an unprecedented entrenchment of barriers to
progressive social change." 181 Along these lines, a committee created by
the British Columbia provincial government to study the draft MAI
concluded that signing the agreement "would be an unacceptable, even
reckless, surrender of sovereignty and democratic control."'18 2 In all
countries, therefore, the "free trade" debate is really about the nature of
society and democracy. With respect to Guatemala, should foreign
investors and their counterparts among local elites have access to
international avenues where they can resist state-directed reforms
authorized by the peace accords? What, in essence, is the appropriate
scope of democratic governance?
There is no doubt that progressively-minded Guatemalan 78
governments (as rare as they are) have long faced constraints on their
policy options stemming from the country's economic dependence on
international markets, intervention by external actors, and the extreme
internal concentration of power, among other factors.18 3 In the past, the
U.S. Government, in particular, has thwarted attempts at reform in
Guatemala in cases where they were viewed as harmful to the interests
of American investors.18 4 Perhaps the starkest example is the role the
U.S. played in toppling the Arbenz government in 1954, after its
179. SELA, supra note 121, pt. V. UNCTAD states that current governments sign
investment agreements "to bind themselves with respect to actions and measures that
they do not wish to take... and make it more difficult for such measures to be taken [by
subsequent governments] in the future." UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 194.
180. SELA, supra note 121, pt. I.
181. Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 95, at 39, 51.
182. BC Special Comm., supra note 141, pt. II (Investor Protection: Expropriation).
183. See WEEKS, supra note 26, at 4. On the Central American region, Weeks
comments: "These are not national economies which trade part of their production, but
economies whose foreign trade penetrates into every aspect of economic life." Id. at 59.
184. According to Cox, the uppermost U.S. priority in Central America since the 1950s
has been "to protect the investment climate for all U.S. corporations." RONALD W. COX,
POWER AND PROFITS: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 14-15 (1994). Weeks also
comments that "probably nowhere else in the hemisphere have U.S. corporate interests so
blatantly determined North American foreign policy." WEEKS, supra note 26, at 55.
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initiation of a broad program of land reform. 185 It is telling that the U.S.
intervention was prompted in large part by claims that the United
Fruit Company had not received adequate compensation for the
expropriation of some of its lands.18 6 Today, American investors remain
the largest source of FDI in the country "by far," according to the U.S.
Department of Commerce,18 7 and one wonders how much their essential
interests have changed.
.9 Within Guatemala itself, domestic elites have historically allied
themselves with foreign interests in order to reinforce their control of
the state and resist reform.' 88 For these groups, one of the primary
goals of the peace process has been to facilitate further integration into
the global economy by providing greater security for foreign
investors. 8 9 Today's agenda shares certain aspects of previous elite
185. See BLUM supra note 47, at 72-83. In subsequent decades, U.S. influence and
intervention continued to shape Guatemala's political and economic destiny. See id. at
147-48, 229-39; COX, supra note 184, at 16, 56.
186. United Fruit also resisted the 1947 labor legislation passed under Juan Jos6
Ardvalo on the basis that it discriminated against foreign companies. See BERGER, supra
note 24, at 44, 66, 70.
187. Exact figures are unavailable since the Guatemalan Government does not track
FDI data. See GUATE. COM. GUIDE, supra note 28, at 60. The primary areas of U.S. FDI in
Guatemala are low-cost assembly of textiles and apparel in the maquila sector, bananas
and other traditional agro-exports, nontraditional agro-exports, and oil. See Peter Morici,
Free Trade in the Americas: A U.S. Perspective, in THE PREMISE AND THE PROMISE: FREE
TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 165 (Sylvia Saborio ed., 1992).
In the maquila sector, Guatemala imported almost one-fifth of U.S. exports to
Central America of semi-manufactured apparel, and exported back nearly one-third of
regional shipments to the U.S. See OAS Trade Unit, supra note 83, at 17. Agri-business is
attracted to the nontraditional agro-export sector by the cheap labor and low land rent
costs, more lenient environmental standards and enforcement, and a favorable climate.
See THRUPP, supra note 23, at 27.
Finally, a U.S. bidder recently won a 50-year concession to operate the previously
state-owned railroad, and other U.S. firms may acquire other privatized state enterprises
in the telecommunications and energy sectors. Incidentally, a concession to operate the
postal service was granted to a private Canadian entity, suggesting that U.S. investors
are not alone in their pursuit of stronger protection under an FTAA. See GUATE. COM.
GUIDE, supra note 28, at 53.
188. See JAMES PAINTER, GUATEMALA: FALSE HOPE, FALSE FREEDOM 29-30 (1987).
Moreover, the agro-export model is controlled by a small minority of economic and
military elites, often with close connections to foreign businesses. Id. at 35-57; see also
BERGER, supra note 24, at 159.
189. Holiday states:
In the 1990s . . . two events occurred that made the private sector
think more seriously about the possible advantages of ending the war
through the peace process. First, the globalization of the world
economy has meant that hemispheric free trade will be the future
economic model, and the insurgency has been considered a serious
barrier to Guatemala's insertion into the world economy. Second, the
URNG began to collect "war taxes" from large landowners and
ranchers ....
Holiday, supra note 57, at 70-71; see also Rachel Sieder, Introduction, in CENTRAL
AMERICA: FRAGILE TRANSITION 7 (Rachel Sieder ed., 1996); TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 65.
For a discussion of Guatemalan neoliberal elite support for joining the NAFTA in the
early 1990s, see PAUL J. DOSAL, POWER IN TRANSITION 190-91 (1995).
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strategies to expand and intensify export production, and encourage
foreign investment.190 Paul Dosal describes the current Guatemalan
elite in this way:
The neoliberals are industrialists, agro-exporters, bankers, and
professionals, a breed of entrepreneurs who distinguish
themselves from the landed oligarchy in their commitment to a
degree of democratization and their willingness to consider a
nonmilitary solution to the civil war. They are, nevertheless,
oligarchs, with a vested interest in the maintenance of a system
in which wealth and power is inequitably distributed .... 191
In terms of the FTAA, therefore, Guatemala's elite is more likely to 80
support, rather than oppose, the restraints that stronger investor
protection would place on the potential for broad-ranging reform under
the peace accords. 192
The popular response to the FTAA, on the other hand, should be the 81
same as in the case of the peace accords themselves: to seek to enhance
opportunities for greater democratic accountability and progressive
change in the future. 193 The first step is to attempt to identify and
understand the potential implications of an FTAA and to nurture
alternative visions of integration in the Americas. 194 Thus, for instance,
190. As has been noted, it was "a goal considered desirable by all Central American
leaders in the nineteenth century" to "integrate the region into the world economy."
BULMER-THOMAS, supra note 24, at 1.
191. DosAL, supra note 189, at 192. Palencia Prado & Holiday offer the following
description of Guatemalan elite:
The conception of modernization that predominates in the private
sector is that of freeing the market to the greatest extent possible from
state intervention and regulation. The idea is for the government to
withdraw from activities that are profitable for the private sector and
provide tax exemptions and other investment incentives.
PALENCIA PRADO & HOLIDAY, supra note 12, at 6.
192. In the area of tax reform, for instance, Guatemala's private sector has
successfully blocked every attempt at reform in the last decade, even though Guatemala
has the lowest tax revenues in the hemisphere-under 8 percent, compared to the
regional norm of 18 percent. See Holiday, supra note 57, at 70.
193. According to Grinspun and Kreklewich, progressive activists:
must articulate the means by which FTAs transfer significant powers
to unelected and unaccountable bodies and institutions, and give the
highest guarantees of expression to the rights and freedoms of
transnational capital. The rhetoric of "globalization" must be
unmasked as it is invoked to deny similar countervailing rights and
freedoms to community-based organizations, associations, and unions.
Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 95, at 54.
194. Cuauhtmoc CArdenas, a prominent leader of the Mexican Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the mayor of Mexico City, has called for an alternative
Trade and Development Pact in North America that would utilize managed trade as a tool
for development, and would include provisions on labor mobility, compensatory financing
for less developed regions, and a social charter that would promote harmonization of
social, labor, and environmental standards to the highest common denominator. See
Grinspun & Cameron, supra note 88, at 19.
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a truly comprehensive legal framework to govern hemispheric
investment flows should provide stable and predictable rules not only
for the protection of investors, but also for the legitimate exercise of
state regulation of FDI. 19 5 At the very least, it should include specific
and clear wording to explicitly limit the application of principles of
investor protection in cases where the risk of constraining legitimate
democratic choices is simply too great. 196 In the case of Guatemala, I
have identified concerns regarding the ability of future governments to
carry out commitments on land under the peace accords. Similar
concerns could be raised with respect to a host of other issues, in every
country. As in most cases, the journey toward a transnational civil
society begins quite close to home. 197
195. UNCTAD, supra note 86, at 133, 166. Rules regarding permissible state
regulation might include, inter alia, policies on employment, protection of the
environment, consumer protection, information disclosure, technology transfer, transfer
pricing and taxation, bribery, and restrictive business practices. See Ganesan, supra note
94, at 4-5.
Mexican civil society organizations have taken the position, in the context of NAFTA,
that foreign investment "needs to be regulated by the State so that it may play a positive
role in national development" and that expropriations should be compensated "according
to timing and value established under Mexican law and in the national currency." RED
MEXICANA DE AccION FRENTE AL LIBRE COMERCIO, ESPEJISMO Y REALIDAD: EL TLCAN
TRES AIos DESPUtS 177-78 (1997).
196. Regarding the content of the FTAA itself, nongovernmental groups from the
Americas have submitted 72 proposals to the Committee of Government Representatives
on the Participation of Civil Society in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Civil
society groups presented a letter to the FTAA investment working group on April 19,
1999, stating that they wished "to inform governments early in the negotiating process
that civil society will oppose efforts to write an MAI or NAFTA-style investment
agreement for the Western Hemisphere through the FTAA." The letter expressed concern
about the impact of an investment agreement on "democratic procedures, economic
development, financial stability, environmental protection, and human rights," and stated
that civil society organization opposed "binding investor-to-state arbitration rules as the
centerpiece of an FTAA investment agreement" as "a closed avenue by which corporations
can bypass normal political and legal channels and attack domestically enacted laws." See
The FTAA Process, BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD), Apr. 1999,
at 10, available at <http://www.ictsd.org/html]arctsd.htm>.
197. "Transnational civil society" is the forum for "globalization-from-below,"
described by Falk as "an array of transnational social forces animated by environmental
concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of human community based
on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, humiliation, and
collective violence." Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS
39, 39 (J. Becher et al. eds, 1993).
46
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol3/iss1/3
